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Merging in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case for Consistent Judicial
Efficiency Analysis
63 Vand. L. Rev. 1697 (2010)
Jamie Henikoff Moffitt
This Article examines current judicial interpretationof Section
7 of the Clayton Act through the lens of negotiation theory. The
research exposes a gap between how courts state they are analyzing
efficiency claims in Section 7 Clayton Act enforcement actions and
what they are actually doing. During periods of lax antitrust
enforcement, this pattern is not readily visible, since almost all
proposed merger and acquisition ("M&A") deals are approved. With a
shift to more aggressive antitrust policy, however, it is critical that
merger review include appropriate weighing of transaction-generated
efficiencies-something missing from courts' current antitrustanalysis.
Although only a small number of Section 7 cases are litigated each
year, corporate negotiators assess thousands of potential M&A deals
annually. For decades, scholars have applied microeconomic models to
analyze antitrust policy. This Article applies analytical frameworks
from the negotiation literature to demonstrate how, in an environment
of increased enforcement, current judicial efficiency analysis would
discourage corporate negotiators from pursuing efficient deals, thereby
hurting the competitiveness of U.S. companies and markets.
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INTRODUCTION

A significant gap exists between how courts say they are
implementing Section 7 of the Clayton Act and what detailed case
analysis reveals they are in fact doing. The purpose of the Clayton Act
is to prevent mergers and acquisitions ("M&A") that may substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.' The courts and the
federal agencies responsible for enforcing the Clayton Act, however,
have also expressly recognized the potential for M&A to contribute
positively to competition through merger-specific efficiencies. 2 These
strategic synergies and cost savings-available only through the
proposed merger-enable merging parties to combine to form stronger,
more nimble organizations better positioned to challenge market
leaders.
This Article examines twenty-five years of Section 7 Clayton
Act cases in which efficiency claims were raised. The analysis reveals
a disturbing pattern. Although courts claim to be balancing mergergenerated efficiencies with other negative factors affecting market
competition, they are not in fact doing so. Rather, courts appear to be
making an assessment of the relevant concentration in the applicable
market and then allowing that initial assessment to color their
recognition of claimed efficiencies. In cases with limited concentration
concerns, courts often cite efficiencies as factors contributing to
market competitiveness. In cases involving highly concentrated

1.
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4
2.
(1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [hereinafter 1997
REVISIONS].
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markets, however, courts often discard similar types of efficiencies. No
balancing analysis is ever performed.
Such inconsistent judicial treatment of efficiency claims has
not presented a significant problem before now because antitrust
enforcement has been relatively lax; the vast majority of proposed
deals proceed without intervention. With the changing economiC3 and
political 4 climate, however, antitrust policy is likely to shift towards
more aggressive enforcement, including increased scrutiny of mergers
and acquisitions.5 This impending enforcement shift, combined with
the failure of courts to appropriately balance efficiencies in Section 7
cases, threatens to worsen the competitiveness of U.S. corporations
and markets. Inconsistent judicial treatment of efficiencies either
blocks or discourages M&A deals that could have contributed to
increased competitiveness.
This Article argues that if courts do not consistently balance
pro-competitive efficiencies against the other anticompetitive effects of
proposed M&A deals, corporations facing stricter antitrust regimes
will abandon important deals that could have contributed to the
competitiveness of the U.S. economy. Part I reviews how courts
currently treat efficiency claims. It highlights some key differences
between how courts say they are weighing efficiency claims and what
an analysis of the case law reveals they are actually doing. Part II
discusses why we are likely to see a shift towards more aggressive
antitrust enforcement. Part III applies several frameworks from the
negotiation field, including Best Alternative to a Negotiated
The recent financial crisis has contributed to far greater public support for increased
3.
regulation of market activity. See Michael Schuman, Why Government Intervention Won't Last,
99
,1862028,00.html
TIMECOM, Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.time.com/timelbusinesslarticle/0,85
(arguing that the financial crisis has strengthened public support for economic regulation, but
that this support is only temporary).
President Obama has made clear that he intends to "reinvigorate antitrust
4.
enforcement," including increased scrutiny of mergers and acquisitions. Michael Orey, Obama
Appoints Antitrust Chief, BuSINESSWEEK, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/content/jan2009/db20090122_987212.htm.
5.
In a statement to the American Antitrust Institute during his campaign, for example,
Senator Obama noted:
At home, for more than a century, there has been broad bipartisan support for
vigorous antitrust enforcement, to protect competition and to foster innovation and
economic growth. Regrettably, the current administration has what may be the
weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the last half century
. . . . As president, I will direct my administration to reinvigorate antitrust
enforcement. It will step up review of merger activity and take effective action to stop
or restructure those mergers that are likely to harm consumer welfare, while quickly
clearing those that do not.
Senator Barack Obama, Statement for the American Antitrust Institute 2 (Sept. 27, 2007),
2
2
2
www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Presidential% 0campaign% 0-% 0
at
available
Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf.
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Agreement ("BATNA") analysis, Zone of Possible Agreement ("ZOPA")
analysis, and Sources of Value analysis to demonstrate how
inconsistent judicial treatment of efficiencies will reduce the volume of
M&A deals and encourage corporations to abandon those deals that
have the greatest potential to increase competition. Finally, Part IV
proposes guidelines for how courts could incorporate efficiencies more
effectively into the initial Section 7 analysis.
I. CURRENT COURT TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCY CLAIMS

Courts addressing Section 7 preliminary injunction cases
generally state that they are applying an antitrust analysis similar to
that outlined in the 1997 Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") /
("DOJ") Joint Merger Guidelines
of Justice
Department
6
("Guidelines"). This analysis provides a framework for evaluating
Section 7 Clayton Act cases and includes the balancing of procompetitive effects of projected efficiencies against other potentially
anticompetitive effects of a proposed deal. In practice, however, a gap
exists between how courts state they are treating efficiencies and the
role that efficiencies actually play in court decisions. As the grid
analysis in this Part illustrates, no true balancing analysis is taking
place.
A. Background on Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, mergers are prohibited if
they either substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly. 7 Determining whether a transaction will "substantially
lessen competition" can be difficult due to the predictive nature of the
analyses involved.8 Courts, therefore, use market share measurements
as a proxy for this criterion. Prosecuting agencies 9 ("Agencies") can
6.
The Agencies issued new Guidelines amending the 1997 Revisions on August 19, 2010.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010),
2010
[hereinafter
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf
REVISIONS]. However, because the courts have not yet heard a case since the release of the 2010
Revisions, this article does not analyze the latest revisions. Further, the Efficiencies section of
the 2010 Revisions is not substantively different from the Efficiencies section of the 1997
Revisions.
7.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
8.
See Malcolm B. Coate, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: An InstitutionalistView, 13 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 189, 225-26 (2005) (discussing the inherent difficulties in using neoclassical
balancing analysis to assess the anticompetitive and pro-competitive efficiency effects of a
proposed merger transaction).
Section 7 enforcement actions are generally brought by either the Federal Trade
9.
Commission, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, or state attorneys general.
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establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that the merged entities
will control a significant portion of the relevant market,1 0 . thus
enabling them to raise prices above normal competitive levels."
Merging parties have the opportunity to rebut the marketshare-based prima facie case by demonstrating that specific
characteristics of the market in question (for example, ease of entry or
sophisticated, powerful buyers) make it unlikely that the merged
entities' market position will have a negative impact on competition. 12
Historically, although a technical rebuttal exists, once the Agencies
have established a prima facie market concentration case, merging
parties have had a very difficult time rebutting the presumption of a
resulting negative impact upon competition. 13 Courts have only
recently begun to give much weight to any of the rebuttal factors that
might mitigate the adverse effects of increased concentration. 14
Of all of the potential rebuttal factors, the one that has proven
the most controversial is that of "efficiencies."1 5 Companies can have
many different motivations for engaging in M&A activity, including
diversification, growth, international expansion, tax advantages,

Private parties may also initiate proceedings. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 574-75 (2d ed. 2006).

10. Interesting issues about how to identify appropriate product and geographic market
definitions often end up determining the outcome of Section 7 cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole
Foods Mkt., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 34 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that the appropriate market against
which to assess the impact of a Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger was supermarkets generally,
rather than the "premium natural and organic supermarket" market). These issues, however,
are well beyond the scope of this Article.
11. FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D.D.C. 1998).
12. See id. at 54 (weighing defendants' argument that factors such as ease of entry and
expansion into the market and the existence of power buyers are sufficient to rebut the Federal
Trade Commission's prima facie case that the merger would lessen competition).
13. Thomas A. Piraino, A New Approach to the Antitrust Analysis of Mergers, 83 B.U. L.
REV. 785, 789 (2003).
14. Id. The first case in which defendants successfully rebutted the government's prima
facie market concentration case was United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974)
(holding uncommitted coal reserve levels rendered current market shares a poor metric of future
competitive position). See also William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and
the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
207, 214 (2003) (explaining that General Dynamics rebutted the government's prima facie
market concentration case by showing that other industry factors meant the merger would not
substantially reduce competition).
15. See Piraino, supra note 13, at 791-92 ("In recent years, the courts and agencies have
become increasingly willing to consider mitigating factors that may rebut the presumption of
illegality for mergers in concentrated markets. Unfortunately, however, neither the courts nor
the agencies have developed standards for determining, first, what mitigating factors should be
deemed particularly relevant, and second, the priority or weight that should be afforded such
factors. Among the most nettlesome issues has been the weight to be afforded the efficiencies
likely to result from a merger.").
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market power, and simply a desire to "empire build."1 6 Sometimes,
however, the driving factor is projected synergies or cost savings.17 By
integrating their operations, management may believe, for example,
that they will be able to manufacture products less expensively,
reduce the size and cost of their sales forces, or eliminate duplicative
infrastructure (for example, HR departments, legal departments, or IT
departments).18 Each of these efficiencies will enable the entity to
operate more effectively-to produce more products and services at a
lower cost.
Depending upon the specific structure of the market in
question, such merger-based efficiencies could lead to increased
competition in the market, despite an increased market concentration
level. 19 If, for example, the third and fourth largest companies in the
market merge, the new combined entity may be better positioned to
compete for business currently dominated by the top two
organizations. The positive effect that the resulting merger efficiencies
have on market competition can offset the negative effect on
competition that may result from increased market concentration.
B. Conflicting Guidancefrom Historic Supreme Court Cases and
ContemporaryAgency Guidelines
Courts facing Section 7 efficiency claims today are caught
Court cases and
between historic-and outdated 20-Supreme

16. See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS
117-68 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing companies' reasons for engaging in merger and acquisition
activities); Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement,
71 CAL. L. REV. 1580, 1584 (1983) (pointing out that during the 1960s economists and lawyers
often thought that the goals of mergers were unrelated to efficiencies).
17. ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE ASHES 30
(2005).
18. See 4A PHILIP E. AREEDA, JOHN L. SOLOW, & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 79-102 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing
types of cost savings that might qualify for an efficiency defense to a prima facie illegal merger).
19. See Coate, supra note 8, at 218 (arguing that the efficient merger of two smaller firms
can give rise to a stronger competitor).
20. As Herbert Hovenkamp has noted:
[M]erger law is the largest area of public antitrust enforcement activity, and an area
where the law as the Supreme Court last left it is indefensible. While antitrust
casebooks continue to print 1960s-vintage merger decisions that have never been
overruled, no one, not even federal judges and certainly not the government
enforcement agencies, pay much attention to them.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 208 (2005). The
mergers the Supreme Court blocked during this era likely would not receive much scrutiny
today. Gregory J. Werden, Next Steps in the Evolution of Antitrust Law: What to Expect from the
Roberts Court, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 49, 63 (2009).
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contemporary Agency antitrust policy. The Supreme Court has not
directly addressed a Section 7 Clayton Act case on the merits in over
thirty years. 21 In part, this is due to the passage of the Hart-ScottRodino Act ("HSR") in 1976. HSR, and its pre-merger notification
requirements, reduced the number of mergers the court system
reviews; instead, most cases are now handled at the Agency level. 22
The historic Supreme Court Section 7 cases were decided
during a time period when (1) mergers were treated with greater
suspicion than today, 23 (2) very few economic tools existed to aid
judges in understanding the actual impact of a proposed deal, 24 and (3)
the Court considered the protection of small businesses to be an
additional underlying goal of antitrust policy. 2 5 Given this context, it
is understandable that almost all of the early Supreme Court cases
ended up ruling against the merger. 26
In 1990, when reviewing Section 7 Supreme Court cases, the
D.C. Circuit noted critically:

21. Donna E. Patterson, Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton Administration, ANTITRUST,
Summer 2001, at 70, 72. Note that in 1990, the Supreme Court did rule on a Section-7-related
matter in which it considered the issue of whether divestiture is a form of injunctive relief
available through Section 16 of the Clayton Act. Although the underlying claim did involve a
Section 7 issue, the Supreme Court only narrowly considered the Section 16 divestiture question.
See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 282 (1990) (holding that the plain text of Section
16 of the Clayton Act authorizes divestiture as a form of injunctive relief).
22. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 579. See also Patterson, supra note 21, at 72
(noting that an unintended consequence of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act's premerger notification
requirement has been a decrease in the number of merger cases that are litigated, because once
parties are informed that federal agencies plan to challenge a proposed merger, they typically
abandon the transaction).
23. Craig W. Conrath & Nicholas A. Widnell, Efficiency Claims in Merger Analysis:
Hostility or Humility?, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 685, 691 (1999).
24. See Werden, supra note 20, at 73-74 ("With respect to Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
Supreme Court jurisprudence is totally out of touch with developments in economics and agency
enforcement because the Court has not considered the merits of a merger case for more than
three decades.").
25. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 557 (explaining that in United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), the Supreme Court's decision to strike down a merger of two
retail grocery store chains that collectively held 8.9 percent of the market was based on the
Court's desire to protect small businesses).
26. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578-81 (1967) (holding "product
extension merger" of diverse manufacturer of household products with leading manufacturer in
household liquid bleach market violated Clayton Act); Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 277 (merger
involving 7.5 percent of grocery store market in L.A area blocked due to "anticompetitive trends"
in the market); United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963) (holding merger of
two Philadelphia banks that held at least thirty percent of commercial banking business in the
four-county Philadelphia metro area violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344-45 (1962) (holding that the merger of two shoe companies
controlling 7.2 percent of retail outlets in a fragmented market violated the Clayton Act due to a
trend of consolidation).
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In the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court construed section 7 to prohibit virtually any
horizontal merger or acquisition. At the time, the Court envisioned an ideal market as
one composed of many small competitors, each enjoying only a small market share; the
more closely a given market approximated this ideal, the more competitive it was
27
presumed to be.

During this time period, the Supreme Court never directly
addressed the issue of an "efficiency defense"; therefore, no specific
precedent exists stating whether potential pro-competitive efficiencies
should be included in the Section 7 competitive impact analysis. 28
Some of the language from these early cases, however, is fairly hostile
to the concept of an efficiency defense. For example, in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, the Court stated, "[W]e cannot fail to recognize
Congress' desire to promote competition, through the protection of
viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance
of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing
considerations in favor of decentralization." 29
A year later in United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank,
the Court noted:
We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen
competition" is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic
debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial . . . . Congress determined to preserve
our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers,
the benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we must assume, that some price
30
might have to be paid.

Finally, in 1967 in Federal Trade Commission v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., the Court most directly stated, "Possible economies
cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that
some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies
but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition."31
Although this language comes very close to rejecting the efficiency
defense outright, scholars have identified various reasons why a
narrow interpretation of this statement is appropriate. 32
27. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
28. See Timothy Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 381, 416 (1980) (noting that no case before the Supreme Court has directly
raised an efficiency defense).
29. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 344.
30. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 371. Note that some commentators believe that this
language referenced other benefits that the transaction would bring to the community and not
specific corporate efficiencies. Muris, supra note 28, at 409.
31. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 580.
32. See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 14, at 211 (noting the Court's hostility in Proctor &
Gamble towards an efficiency defense). Reasons why one should not interpret the Court in
Proctor & Gamble as explicitly rejecting the efficiency defense include: (1) the context of the
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At times, Supreme Court dicta from these older cases goes even
a step further, implying that not only should efficiencies not be
recognized as a positive merger benefit, but also revealing that they
33
Supreme
were actually considered to be a negative consideration.
give
would
Court Justices feared that merger-generated efficiencies
the new combined organization an unfair advantage against smaller,
existing businesses. 34 It is unlikely that the Supreme Court of this
earlier era would have validated the type of efficiencies claims being
made today.
In stark contrast to this hostile view of mergers and
efficiencies, recent Agency actions and guidelines explicitly recognize
the potential positive, pro-competitive impact of merger-generated
efficiencies. The FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ hold
concurrent jurisdiction for prosecuting Section 7 Clayton Act claims. 35
Over the years, their publicly released Guidelines have slowly
acknowledged and incorporated efficiencies into the analysis of the
competitive effects of horizontal mergers.
Courts assessing Section 7 efficiency claims today face an
interesting situation. Although the early Supreme Court cases were
clearly hostile to efficiency claims, the Guidelines and recent Agency
actions have been more supportive. 36 Unfortunately, the legislative
history of Section 7 does not clarify whether, or to what extent,
Congress expected courts to consider potential efficiencies in Section 7
Court's rejection could be read to only be rejecting the efficiency defense as a defense to
entrenchment, (2) the Court was only addressing a situation where efficiencies were considered
to be "possible," but not probable, or (3) the Court was not rejecting the efficiency defense
outright because "the parties did not place the issue of a general efficiency justification before the
Court." Muris, supra note 28, at 412-13.
33. Robert Pitofsky, Efficiency Considerationand Merger Enforcement: Comparison of U.S.
and EU Approaches, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1413, 1416 (2007) ("The treatment of efficiencies in
the United States began with a notable misstep. In 1962 in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in the first merger case it considered after the Clayton Act was thoroughly
revised in 1950 to augment governmental power to challenge mergers, concluded that efficiencies
realized in mergers could weigh against the legality of a merger.").
34. In 1969, Oliver Williamson noted that, "[a]s things stand now, we observe the
regrettable condition in which a company proposing a merger, an apparent effect of which is to
realize economies, consciously suppresses the economies aspect lest it be used affirmatively by
the government to attack the merger." Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits
of Antitrust, AM. EcON. REV., May 1969, at 105, 113. In Brown Shoe Co., the first Section 7 case
heard by the Supreme Court under the amended Clayton Act, the government actually argued
that the merger was anticompetitive because it would allow the company to lower prices due to
efficiencies gained through vertical integration. In a strange twist, the defendants actually
denied that the merger would generate any efficiencies. Muris, supra note 28, at 403-04.
35. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 574-75.
36. 1997 REVISIONS, supra note 2, § 4 ("Efficiencies generated through merger can enhance
the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved
quality, enhanced service, or new products.").
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Clayton Act cases. 37 The discussions that took place prior to the 1950
amendments to Section 7 focused on the negative competitive impacts
of increased market concentration levels; they did not squarely
address the issue of whether, or how, efficiencies resulting from a
merger should be considered in the analysis. 38

C. How the Courts SAY They Are Treating Efficiency Claims
Although it is not binding authority, lower courts generally say
that they are applying antitrust analysis consistent with the
Guidelines framework when analyzing Section 7 cases and efficiency
claims. 39 The Guidelines state that
[t]he Agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and
magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant
market. To make the requisite determination, the Agency considers whether cognizable

37. Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global
Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 211-12 (1992). Some commentators have noted that at that time,
legislators did not perceive a conflict between promoting efficiency and protecting consumers via
antitrust policy. Fisher & Lande, supra note 16, at 1587-88; see also Robert M. Vernail, One Step
Forward, One Step Back: How the Pass-On Requirement for Efficiencies Benefits in FTC v.
Staples Undermines the Revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Efficiencies Section, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 133, 138 (1998).
38. Pitofsky, supra note 37, at 211-12. In the legislative history, there was a committee
report that noted that the statute was not meant to prevent two small companies from merging
to compete more effectively with a larger rival. Id. at 212 (noting that if Congress had analyzed
this example, they would have recognized it as a narrow application of the Efficiency Defense);
see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE
NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE ch. 2, p. 4 (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov
/opp/global/report/gv1.pdf [hereinafter ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY] ("The legislative
history of Section 7 of the Clayton Act does not expressly address efficiencies or whether
efficiencies could be evaluated in a Section 7 action. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower
court nor the Federal Trade Commission has ever interpreted the legislative history as expressly
requiring or absolutely foreclosing a consideration of efficiencies in a merger analysis under
Section 7.").
39. See FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 37 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Thus, an analysis
of the likely competitive effects of a merger requires determinations of (1) the relevant product
market, (2) the relevant geographic market, and (3) the transaction's probable effect on
competition in those markets .... Under the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of
Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines, a market with a post-merger HHI above 1800 is
considered 'highly concentrated,' and mergers that increase the HHI in such a market by more
than 100 points 'are presumed . . . likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its
exercise.' Although the Merger Guidelines are not binding on the Court, they provide a 'useful
illustration of the application of HHI.' "); id. at 39 ("The Merger Guidelines recognize that
'mergers have the potential to generate significant efficiencies by permitting a better utilization
of existing assets, enabling the combined firm to achieve lower costs in producing a given
quantity and quality than either firm could have achieved without the proposed transaction.'
Although the Supreme Court has not sanctioned the efficiencies defense in Section 7 cases, 'the
trend among lower courts is to recognize the defense.' ").
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efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm
40
consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.

The Guidelines expressly outline that a balancing approach be
taken, with potential pro-competitive efficiencies balanced against
other potential anticompetitive impacts of the merger.41 This
balancing is clearly a difficult task, as both the "pro-competitive" and
"anticompetitive" impacts are projections. 42 Furthermore, the
impacts-both positive and adverse-are generally based on economic
models of predicted behavior, rather than allegations of specific, illegal
behavior, such as price-fixing. 43 The Guidelines also state that
efficiencies are most likely to impact decisions in situations where the
anticompetitive effects are not "great."44
The lower courts typically use market concentration figures, as
calculated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), as a starting
point to determine whether a merger raises potential anticompetitive
issues. The HHI of a market is calculated by taking the sum of the
squares of all of the competitors' market shares in the industry. 45 The
Guidelines broadly divide markets into three basic categories: unconcentrated (HHI below 1,000), moderately concentrated (HHI

40. 1997 REVISIONS, supra note 2, § 4.
41. Id. ("The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger-as indicated by
the increase in the HHI and postmerger HHI from Section 1, the analysis of potential adverse
competitive effects from Section 2, and the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of entry from
Section 3-the greater must be cognizable efficiencies in order for the Agency to conclude that
the merger will not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. When the potential
adverse competitive effect of a merger is likely to be particularly large, extraordinarily great
cognizable efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive.").
42. See A.E. Rodriguez & M.B. Coate, Merger Pitfalls in Practice: Three Case Studies, 20 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 793, 798 (1999) ("The evaluation of the likely competitive effects of a
proposed merger or acquisition is one of the more complicated tasks facing antitrust regulators
because almost all of the analysis is, by necessity, forward-looking.").
43. In recent years, both the FTC and DOJ have increasingly relied on " 'unilateral effects'
theories" to block M&A deals. Piraino, supra note 13, at 804. The basic idea is that dominant
firms with large market shares can affect market price unilaterally, without needing to explicitly
or tacitly collude with other competitors. See id.
44. See 1997 REVISIONS, supranote 2, § 4 ("In the Agency's experience, efficiencies are most
likely to make a difference in merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent
the efficiencies, are not great. Efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or nearmonopoly.").
45. Id. § 1.5. For example if ten firms exist, each with ten percent market share, the HHI
for the market will be 1,000 (102+102+102+102+102+102+102+102+102+102). In contrast, if one firm
has ninety-one percent of the market and the other nine firms each have one percent market
share, the HHI will be 8,290 (8,281 (912) + 9 for the other 9 firms that have 1 percent share
each). A market dominated by a monopoly would have an HHI of 10,000 (100 x 100).
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between 1,000 and 1,800), and highly concentrated (HHI above
1,800).46
For each category, the Guidelines outline basic assumptions
about the impact that potential mergers will have on market
dynamics. For example, in moderately concentrated industries,
mergers that raise the HHI by more than 100 points will "potentially
raise significant competitive concerns"; in highly concentrated
industries, mergers that raise HHI by more than 100 points are
presumed "likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its
exercise."47 Against this rather concrete and specific measurement,
courts attempt to balance other factors, such as ease of entry, buyer
concentration, and potential efficiencies, to assess whether the overall
impact of the merger will be anticompetitive.
Balancing these other, more subjective, factors against specific
HHI concentration figures can be difficult. 48 Yet, this balancing
analysis is extremely important. Not only does it help courts
determine the projected impact of any particular merger, but also it
creates precedent as to how courts weigh specific efficiencies against
other potential anticompetitive effects of proposed deals. This
precedent is extremely important to potential acquirers as companies
assess whether a particular deal will likely raise Section 7 concerns.

D. How the Courts ARE TreatingEfficiency Claims
There is a significant gap between how courts state that they
are treating efficiency claims and how projected synergies are actually
being incorporated into courts' decisionmaking processes. Courts do
not appear to be engaging in any true balancing of the pro-competitive
effects of efficiencies versus other anticompetitive aspects of a
proposed deal. Instead, case analysis demonstrates that they first
make a determination regarding market concentration levels and then
allow that analysis to color their assessment of the associated
efficiencies.
In situations involving lower levels of market concentration,
courts have recognized significant merger-generated efficiencies. In
cases involving higher market concentration, however, the courts have
discarded similar types of efficiencies as non-cognizable.
46. Id. The 2010 Guidelines adjusted the ranges for HHI categories: unconcentrated (HHI
below 1500), moderately concentrated (HHI between 1,500 and 2,500, and highly concentrated
(HHI above 2500). 2010 REVISIONS, supra note 6, § 5.3.
47. Id. § 1.51.
48. See Coate, supra note 8, at 225-26 (noting that balancing these factors would require a
multistep analysis).

2010]

MERGING IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW

1709

Courts apply three criteria to determine whether efficiencies
will be recognized: (1) verifiability-whether the efficiency claims are
supported by data, (2) merger specificity-whether the efficiencies
could be achieved through other less restrictive means, and (3)
consumer pass-through-whether the efficiencies will ultimately
benefit consumers. Few efficiency projections satisfy all three criteria.
1. Balancing of Efficiency Claims
Craig Conrath and Nicholas Widnell have observed that "[t]he
difficult challenge presented by such an efficiencies defense is whether
there is a coherent way to balance the potential anticompetitive effects
of a merger against its potential efficiency benefits. This question ...
has remained a perennial topic of debate among antitrust
practitioners." 49 How should the courts decide whether the claimed
efficiencies offset any projected anticompetitive effects of the merger?50
One significant problem with current judicial treatment of
Section 7 efficiency claims is that the recognition of efficiencies is
lopsided. In 1999, prior to his term in office, former FTC Chairman
Timothy Muris observed a similar pattern with Agency decisions.
Too often, the Agencies found no cognizable efficiencies when
anticompetitive effects were determined to be likely and seemed to
recognize efficiency only when no adverse effects were predicted. Thus
the Agencies tended to reach a conclusion on likely anticompetitive
effects of a merger, a decision that influenced their conclusions
regarding efficiencies.51
In other words, the Agencies appeared to be first coming to a
considering
effects-without
on
anticompetitive
conclusion
efficiencies-and then allowing that decision to impact their
assessment of efficiencies.
Unfortunately, the troubling Agency pattern that Timothy
Muris observed in 1999 is now clearly discernable in courts' treatment
of Section 7 efficiency claims as well. With the exception of some
hospital mergers, courts recognize substantial efficiencies only in
cases with limited projected anticompetitive effects. In cases in which

49. Conrath & Widnell, supra note 23, at 686.
50. See Paul Rogers, The Limited Case for an Efficiency Defense in Horizontal Mergers, 58
TUL. L. REV. 503, 540 (1983) ("The ultimate question is what amount of efficiency gain will offset
what amount of increased market power."). Conceptually, this may not seem too difficult an idea
to grasp. The issues arise, however, when courts attempt to move from the realm of theoretical
concepts to concrete, real market assessments.
51. See Timothy Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All
These Years, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729, 731 (1999).
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anticompetitive impacts are more likely, courts are shying away from
any true balancing. Instead, they simply declare the claimed
efficiencies in these cases to be insubstantial or unverifiable.
2. The Grid Analysis: A Bimodal Pattern
An analysis of all available Section 7 preliminary injunction
cases involving efficiency claims over the past twenty-five years
confirms the view that courts are not performing any true balancing
analysis. The twenty-three cases analyzed span a broad range of
industries including tank ammunition, baby food, supermarkets, coal
mining, wholesale prescription drugs, wagering software, aircraft
transparencies, gasoline, fluid milk processing, food service glassware,
enterprise resource planning software applications, and office
supplies. Seven of the twenty-three cases involved hospital mergers.
The cases took place between 1986 and 2009. Approximately half were
heard in either the D.C. District Court or the D.C. Court of Appeals;
the rest were spread among many different jurisdictions.
In fourteen of the twenty-three cases (sixty-one percent) the
Agencies successfully obtained a preliminary injunction to block the
intended merger transaction. In the other nine cases, the court held
that there was not enough evidence of negative competitive effect to
justify a preliminary injunction. Interestingly, an analysis of the cases
based on market concentration alone does not fully explain the court
rulings. The following charts provide the full citations for each case
and classify the twenty-three cases based on the level of underlying
market concentration. 5 2 Although preliminary injunctions were issued
in the majority of cases involving high market concentration, they
were not issued in all of the cases. Furthermore, the cases involving
medium market concentration were split in terms of outcome. The
level of market concentration clearly contributes to the court's
decision, but it does not explain the whole story.

52. For purposes of this analysis, markets were categorized as having "high" concentration
levels if the court recognized a resulting HHI from the merger transaction of over 3,000.
"Medium" concentration categorization represents transactions that would result in HHI market
concentration levels of 2,000-3,000. Those cases categorized as having "low" concentration levels
generally involved situations where the court felt that the Agencies failed to define a narrowly
focused geographic and product market resulting in any significant level of market
concentration.
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Full Citations for Cases Analyzed
Federal Trade Commission v. Butterworth Health Corp.,
946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff'd, 121 F. 3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc.,
754 F. Supp. 669 (Minn. 1990).
United States v. CarilionHealth System,
707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D Va. 1989), aff'd, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished opinion).
United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
Federal Trade Commission v. Arch Coal,
329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004).
Federal Trade Commission v. Foster W. Ref., Inc.,
2007 WL 1793441 (D.N.M. June 11, 2007)
Federal Trade Commission v. Tenet Health Care Corp.,
186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
Federal Trade Commission v. Swedish Match,
131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000).
Federal Trade Commission v. CardinalHealth, Inc.,
12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998).
Federal Trade Commission v. Univ. Health, Inc.,
938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
Federal Trade Commission v. Alliant Techsystems,
808 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1992).
Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Heinz Co.,
246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Federal Trade Commission v. PPG,Indus.,
798 F.2d 1500, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Federal Trade Commission v. Libbey, Inc.,
211 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002).
United States v. United Tote, Inc.,
768 F. Supp. 1064 (Del. 1991).
Federal Trade Commission v. CCC Holdings, Inc.,
605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.C. 2009).
United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp.,
717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc.,
970 F. Supp. 1066, (D.D.C. 1997).
United States v. Franklin Elec. Co.,
130 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
Californiav. Am. Stores Co.,
697 F. Supp. 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 872 F.2d
837 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
Federal Trade Commission v. Ill. Cereal Mills,
691 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1988), affd, 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989).
United States v. Mercy Health Serus.,
902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), dismissed as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Oracle Corp.,
331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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Table 1: Market Concentration Analysis
Concentration
Low (HHI < 2,000)

Medium (HHI 2,000-3,000)

0

Cu

Am. Stores
Illinois Cereal

High (HHI > 3,000)
Swedish Match
Cardinal Health
Univ. Health
Alliant Tech
Heinz
PPG
Libbey
United Tote
CCC
Rockford
Staples
Franklin

.0

z

Country Lake
Carilion Health
D
Long Island
Tenet Health
2 Mercy Health
Oracle

Arch Coal
Foster Western

Butterworth

A similar analysis focusing solely on recognized efficiencies
appears to better explain judicial decisions, but still fails to tell the
whole story. In the following table, the twenty-three cases are
characterized based on the level of efficiencies the court recognized.
Cases are characterized as having "high" efficiencies if the court
identified the merger as generating significant efficiencies, "medium"
if the court recognized that the transaction would generate some
efficiencies, and "low" if the court discounted the projected efficiencies
altogether due to concerns over verifiability, merger specificity, or
consumer pass-through. Appendix I at the end of this Article contains
a detailed analysis of the data supporting the market concentration
and efficiency levels identified in Tables 1 and 2.
As Table 2 demonstrates, there appears to be a fairly strong
correlation between recognized efficiencies and court decisions
regarding whether to issue a preliminary injunction (that is, in cases
where the court identified either "medium" or "high" efficiencies, no
preliminary injunction was granted); however, the outcomes for cases
involving "low" efficiencies are still mixed.
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Table 2: Efficiency Analysis

Recognized Efficiencies

.)

o4

Low
Swedish Match
Cardinal Health
Univ. Health
Alliant Tech
Heinz
PPG
Libbey
United Tote
CCC
Rockford
Staples
Franklin
Am. Stores
Illinois

*0

z

Medium

High

Central

Mercy Health
Oracle

Arch Coal
Foster Western
Tenet Health

Butterworth
Country Lake
Carilion Health
Long Island

(market
the two variables
Only by superimposing
the
does
chart,
concentration and efficiencies) together in the same
pattern of judicial decisionmaking become clear. As Table 3
market
of court-recognized
the combination
demonstrates,
perfectly
correlates
efficiencies
transaction-related
and
concentration
with the holdings in all twenty-three cases. All cases with the same
combination of factors (that is, the same level of market concentration
and recognized efficiencies) result in the same court holding. In Table
3, cases listed in the shaded blocks are those that resulted in
preliminary injunctions. Those in the other blocks of the grid did not.
As the grid demonstrates, all cases involving low-recognized
efficiencies and either medium or high market concentration levels
resulted in preliminary injunctions. All other cases did not. There are
no mixed blocks in the grid.
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Table 3: Market Concentration & Efficiencies
Concentration
Low (HHI < 2,000) Medium (HHI 2,000-3,000)
Country Lake
Carilion Health

Butterworth

Long Island

Tenet Health

High (HHI > 3,000)

Arch Coal
Foster Western

EJ

>a

Mercy Health

4 Oracle

= Preliminary Injunction Issued
Table 3 appears to provide data demonstrating robust,
sophisticated, and consistent judicial treatment of these Section 7
cases. No one variable explains the case holdings. The pattern of
judicial decisionmaking is only revealed when multiple criteria are
considered and the courts appear to have treated "like" cases
similarly. There is, however, a problem with this interpretation.
The courts' rulings are perfectly correlated with the levels of
identified market concentration and recognized efficiencies. Table 3
categorizes the cases based on these two "input" factors. Given the
number of cases heard over the last twenty-five years, one would
expect to see a broad array of input combinations on the grid (for
example, cases involving high market concentration and high
efficiency levels, low concentration and medium efficiency levels,
medium market concentration and high efficiency levels). If there
were any selection bias for the input factors of these cases, it would
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logically tip the balance in favor of the "close calls," as the cases most
likely to proceed with litigation would be ones, for example, with high
market concentration and high efficiency levels.
The data, however, reveal a completely different picture. A
bimodal pattern appears in the opposite direction of what the selection
bias would predict. Recognition of high levels of efficiencies generally
only occurs in cases where concentration levels are relatively low.
Similarly, almost all cases that involved high concentration levels
involved low recognized levels of efficiencies. The only cases not to
consistently follow this pattern involve hospital mergers. In these
cases, the non-profit nature of the organizations merging appears to
affect courts' recognition of efficiencies. 53 In almost all other cases,
courts only recognized significant efficiencies in situations where they
had already determined that the merger did not substantially increase
market concentration.

53. See, e.g., FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
("Of critical importance in the Court's evaluation of the evidence, as detailed above, are the
following considerations. First, nonprofit hospitals operate differently in highly-concentrated
markets than do profit-maximizing firms. Second, the boards of these two hospitals are
comprised of prominent community and business leaders whose employees depend on these
facilities for services, and who have demonstrated their genuine commitment to serve the greater
Grand Rapids community through their governance of the hospitals . . . . Fifth, substantial costsavings and efficiencies would be realized as a result of the merger.").
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Table 4: The Bimodal Pattern-All Cases
Concentration
Low (HI < 2,000) Medium (HHI 2,000-3,000) High (HHI > 3,000)
Counh
Caril
Long

Butterworth

S
Tenet Hea
wedish Match

atrdinal Health
iv. Health
11iaint Tech
Mercy Health
O
SOracle

Am. Stores
Illinois Cere

nFr:
Although courts have recognized significant efficiencies related
to production economies of scale, 54 operational efficiencies from
spreading administrative costs over a broader organization,'55 capital
avoidance,5 6 and improved quality of services,5 7 they have only done so
in situations where the associated merger did not create market
concentration concerns. In cases where mergers did create market

54. See, e.g., United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 680 (D. Minn.
1990) (discussing the possibilities of economies of scale as merger-created efficiencies).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 148
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (acknowledging the possibility of cost sharing among the hospitals that propose
to merge, but remaining unconvinced that it is the correct method for analyzing the potential
merger).
56. Id. at 148-49 (listing capital avoidance as an efficiency created by the merger).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 849 (W.D. Va. 1989)
(looking favorably on a merger of non-profit hospitals because of a projected increase in quality of
services).
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concentration issues, similar types of efficiencies were almost always
discredited.5 8
This pattern is even more noticeable when the transactions
involving hospital mergers are removed from the analysis.
Table 5: The Bimodal Pattern-Non-hospital Mergers
Con
Lov
U

on
Medium (HHI 2,000-3,000) | High (HHI >3,000)

I

Cou:

sh Match
Health
SIech

tal
0

I

Oracle

Am. Stores
Illinois Cereal

I

I

|Frai

Courts' current treatment of efficiencies in Section 7 cases is
troubling. Efficiencies are not being judged according to their
individual merits, but rather in relationship to the other perceived
anticompetitive effects of the merger. This means that identical sets of
predicted efficiencies could be treated very differently in two different
mergers.
It would be theoretically sound to find that a set of projected
efficiencies justifies a merger in one context, but not in another due to
the other anticompetitive effects of the deal, as long as this

determination took place during the balancingportion of the analysis.
58. See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720-24 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (requiring "proof
of extraordinary efficiencies" in the case of high market concentration); FTC v. CCC Holdings,
Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 72-75 (D.D.C. 2009) (demanding significant proof of concrete efficiencies
in a high market concentration industry).
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Unfortunately this is not what is currently occurring in the courts.
Different merger contexts appear to be influencing whether the courts
recognize the efficiencies in the first place. In situations without
significant anticompetitive risks, courts are recognizing projected
efficiencies as valid. In situations with competitive concerns, similar
efficiencies are being characterized as unverifiable.
3. Recognition of Efficiency Projections
Courts use three main criteria to disregard efficiencies:
verifiability, merger specificity, and ultimate consumer pass-through.
The verification requirement has proven extremely challenging for
companies to meet.5 9 Merging companies must "substantiate" claims
6
so they can be "verified."o
By definition, efficiency claims are based on future predictions,
which makes it easy for courts to discount them as too vague and
speculative. 6 1 Information asymmetries contribute to the problem.
Merging entities have sole possession of documents and information
relating to projected efficiencies. 62 Courts understandably hesitate to

59. See, e.g., FTC v. Univ. Health Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Here,
however, the appellees have failed to introduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that their
transaction would yield any efficiencies, and the district court's factual finding to the contrary is
clearly erroneous."); Coate, supra note 8, at 230-31 ("Based on the review of the recent court
cases (and abstracting from the hospital mergers), it would appear that the efficiency defense
faces an impossibly high burden which as a practical matter, virtually precludes the
operationalization of the efficiency defense.").
60. Specifically, the 1997 Revisions state:
[Tihe merging firms must substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agency can verify
by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how
and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance
the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be mergerspecific. Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague or speculative or
otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means.
1997 REVISIONS, supra note 2, § 4.
61. See, e.g., FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 172 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Without
significantly more evidence to substantiate the savings purported in this case, and without
greater clarity on the state of antitrust law in this circuit, the defendants are unable to rebut the
presumption here with an efficiencies defense."). Some commentators argue that the same
standard of proof should be applied to efficiencies that is applied currently to assertions that a
transaction will be anticompetitive. See Malcolm B. Coate & A.E. Rodriguez, Pitfalls in Merger
Analysis: The Dirty Dozen, 30 N.M. L. REV. 227, 234 (2000) ("On balance, it seems difficult to
justify a different standard of proof for merger-related efficiencies and anticompetitive effects. An
analyst would be well advised to apply the same basic probability decision rule to efficiency and
anticompetitive effects.").
62. See Mark N. Berry, Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers: In Search of a Defense, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 515, 542 (1996) ("The merging firms may be the only potential source of
information about the claimed efficiencies."); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust
Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 703 (1977) (discussing how an "information-
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give much weight to this evidence, given concerns that corporations
will selectively disclose information to support their efficiency claims,
while ignoring data that might dampen their assertions. 63 Courts also
tend to be critical of corporate efficiency projections that change over
time, generally growing more critical as the organization gets closer to
a hearing or trial. 64 Therefore, courts attach more credibility to
internal corporate documents that pre-date the merger agreement or
letter of intent. 65
Although it might seem reasonable to discount corporate
projections that tend to fluctuate over time, the fact that a merging
entity can better identify an increasing number of potential
efficiencies with greater accuracy over time actually makes sense
given the increased access to competitive information that is allowed
the closer one gets to the close of a transaction.6 6 This pattern is
typical and should be a source of reassurance that the transaction is
proceeding normally, rather than a cause of distrust.
A second issue that arises when companies attempt to
substantiate projected efficiencies relates to classification. Which
types of efficiencies should count? Originally, both the Agencies and
courts articulated a very narrow interpretation of efficiencies, one that

impactedness" condition provides the merging entities with a strategic advantage in determining
what information to disclose).
63. See Rogers, supra note 50, at 518-19 (explaining that courts are "[a]fraid of what has
been characterized as the pairing of opportunism with 'information impactedness' " and therefore
shy away from efficiency arguments); Arthur L. Scinta, Early Experience with the New Efficiency
Guidelines, ANTITRUST, Summer 1997, at 17, 20 (discussing the judicial tendency to Look with
suspicion at efficiency claims).
64. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1089 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting inconsistencies
in the cost-savings numbers offered by the defendant); United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp.,
717 F. Supp. 1251, 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("The court is initially suspicious of the defendants'
savings schedule because of the relatively little attention placed on savings by the defendants in
planning for and agreeing upon the merger. The formal study of efficiencies was hastily
commenced well after the announcement of the merger.").
65. See, e.g., Deborah A. Garza, The New Efficiencies Guidelines: The Same Old Wine in a
More TransparentBottle, ANTITRUST, Summer 1997, at 6, 8 (encouraging parties to document
anticipated efficiencies prior to announcing a merger).
66. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 584 (discussing limitations that exist on
sharing confidential business information before a merger deal closes); Coate, supra note 8, at
195 ("To avoid setting a prohibitive burden, staff must understand the limitations HSR
regulations place on the parties. In setting its bid for the target, the firm only has access to a
limited amount of information. Once the bid is accepted, the firm obtains a little more access, as
it can undertake 'due diligence' to ensure the target's information on which it based its bid was
accurate. Thus, it appears appropriate for the staff to expect efficiency analysis with a similar
degree of specificity. Analyses formally submitted to the Board of Directors to justify the bid
should be given great weight.").
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focused mainly on manufacturing economies of scale.67 In reality,
however, a broad range of efficiencies can contribute to a company's
ability to compete in the marketplace. 68
In 1995, under the leadership of FTC Chairman Robert
Pitofksy, the FTC launched an in-depth investigation focusing on the
impact of increasing innovation and globalization on the U.S.
economy. 69 The resulting report, Anticipating the 21st Century:
Competition Policy in the New High-Tech Global Marketplace,
acknowledged the stiff competition that U.S. businesses were
increasingly facing from foreign firms. 70 During two months of
hearings, witnesses suggested various ways that the FTC could adjust
its competition policy to avoid hamstringing U.S. firms' ability to
compete in the new, innovation-based global economy.71 At the top of
the suggestion list were proposals to significantly adjust the Agency's
treatment of merger-related efficiency claims. 72
The 1996 FTC Task Force Report acknowledged specifically
that marketplace changes were demanding new skills and capabilities.
"Competition has begun to focus on the dimensions of innovation, such
as speed of developing, producing, and marketing improved products
and the ease of responding to shifts in customer demand and supplier
capabilities." 73 Mergers can contribute to the competitiveness of U.S.
companies, not only by reducing manufacturing costs, but also
through improving research and development ("R&D"), product
development, marketing efforts, customer service capabilities, and
other core competencies. These are factors that distinguished
companies in the global marketplaces of 1996, and they will continue
67. See, e.g., FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 61 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Efficiencies
are cost savings generated by the increased economies of scale which result from mergers."). This
traditional, narrow definition of efficiencies misses many of the potential ways (e.g., through
R&D synergies) that a merger can position an organization to be a more aggressive, better
competitor.
68. See, e.g., Coate, supra note 8, at 226-27 ("Other efficiencies will enable the creation of
new markets as the reorganization generated by the merger allows the postmerger firm to serve
a customer need previously precluded by high transaction costs. If these efficiencies are relevant,
numerical balancing of effects becomes very difficult.").
69. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, Executive Summary and Principal Conclusions 1, in
ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY supra note 38 (explaining the FTC investigation).
70. Id. ("U.S. firms can no longer be content with besting domestic competitors; their
fiercest rivals now are often foreign firms.").
71. See id. (stating that the hearings produced suggestions on how to compact this
competition).
72. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 38, ch. 1, at 35
("[A]ntitrust must take special care to weed out actions that harm competition while not
discouraging others that are procompetitive. For mergers, this means antitrust must give more
attention to efficiencies claims than it may have previously done."); id. ch. 2, at 11-15.
73. Id. ch. 1, at 18.
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to do so in years to come. These efficiencies should also be "counted" in
merger analysis. 74 Unfortunately, the courts do not recognize many of
the efficiencies with the greatest potential to improve an
organization's competitive position (for example, complimentary R&D
or product design capabilities) as they are often difficult to verify.75
In addition to being "verifiable," efficiencies weighed in a
Section 7 competitive analysis must also be "merger specific." The
1997 Guidelines state that "[tlhe Agency will only consider those
efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and
unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed
merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive
effects." 76 Cost savings and other benefits will not be credited to a
merger if there are other, less anticompetitive ways to achieve the
same outcome.77
Although this may seem like a fairly straightforward and
logical criterion, issues arise when courts attempt to assess this
criterion. What "other" methods should be considered? What if the
company could merge with a different, smaller organization, but that
74. See id. ch. 2, at 32 ("When considering the likelihood that a transaction will create
efficiencies that may affect postmerger competitive dynamics, the FTC should not foreclose
examination of a potentially wide range of efficiencies (both product and process), from
economies of scale and plant specialization to distributional, promotional, transactional,
managerial, and innovation efficiencies that may differ from traditional efficiency claims.").
75. See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("In the absence of
reliable and significant evidence that the merger will permit innovation that otherwise could not
be accomplished, the district court had no basis to conclude that the FTC's showing was rebutted
by an innovation defense."); United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1288-89
(N.D. Ill. 1989) ("As to qualitative benefits to consumers, the defendants proclaim that the
merger of SAH and RMH will provide the Rockford community with a first class regional tertiary
referral center that will eventually rival tertiary referral centers in Madison, Chicago,
Milwaukee and Rochester. The defendants promise that the number, depth, and quality of
services at the hospital will improve . . . . The court finds the defendants' intention to create a
state-of-the-art tertiary referral center and all its corresponding benefits in quality and
community development as irrelevant for the present Sec. 7 inquiry."); Coate, supra note 8, at
231 ("Moreover, efficiencies that cannot be easily quantified are downplayed, even though these
savings might really affect the marketplace. Attempts to quantify these qualitative savings
simply set them up for formal rejection."). Courts generally only recognize a narrow range of
efficiencies, typically in cases where the underlying merger did not present much of an
anticompetitive threat. See Garza, supra note 65, at 6.
76. 1997 REVISIONS, supra note 2, § 4.
77. See, e.g., FTC v. PPG, Indus., 798 F.2d 1500, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Finally the district
court found that a merger of PPG and Swedlow might lead to the development of more
sophisticated materials and/or transparencies . . . . [T]he gains to be derived from technological
cooperation are not exclusive to a PPG-Swedlow marriage; cooperation with other market
participants could yield similar results without causing the same market concentration.");
William J. Kolasky, Lessons from Baby Food: The Role of Efficiencies in Merger Review,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 82, 86 (anticipating an argument that Heinz was neglecting other less
anticompetitive measures while putting forth an efficiency defense).

1722

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:6:1697

entity is unlikely to be receptive to a deal? What if an R&D joint
venture were possible between three organizations in the field, but it
would put an organization's critical trade secrets at risk?78 Should
these alternatives be considered?
Fortunately, the 1997 Guidelines clarified that only those
alternatives that are operationally practical, instead of simply
theoretically possible, should be considered. 79 Still, many
commentators feel that the criterion ends up being used excessively to
discredit efficiency claims.80 In particular, courts often point to the fact
that companies could achieve similar efficiencies through internal
growth as a reason to take projected efficiencies out of the competitive
analysis.81 Although it is true that many companies could eventually
"grow" their way into cost savings (for example, by spreading fixed
costs such as manufacturing investments over a larger revenue base),
internal, organic growth is typically a multi-year process that
significantly delays an organization's ability to adjust its cost base to
compete more aggressively. It often does not permit an organization to
gain the same level of competitive advantage that a merger could
provide. 82
The final criterion that projected efficiencies must satisfy in
order to be included in Section 7 competitive analysis is referred to as
"consumer pass-through." 83 Any efficiencies generated from the
merger transaction must directly benefit consumers. They cannot

78. Note that licensing contracts and joint ventures can sometimes provide less restrictive
mechanisms for capturing efficiencies. Pitofsky, supranote 37, at 243-44.
79.
See 1997 REVISIONS, supra note 2, § 4 ("Only alternatives that are practical in the
business situation faced by the merging firms will be considered in making this determination;
the Agency will not insist upon a less restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical.").
80. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77, 78
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) ("[M]erger parties usually cannot prove that their merger is likely to
produce net efficiencies that could not otherwise be achieved."); Piraino, supra note 13, at 798
("Requiring defendants to prove that efficiencies will be merger-specific poses several problems.
The requirement allows judges, juries, and antitrust regulators to second-guess defendants'
business judgment and substitute speculation on hypothetical 'less restrictive' alternatives.").
81. See FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Weighing the
evidence before it, this Court finds that the Defendants have sufficiently proved that significant
efficiencies would likely result from the proposed mergers . . . . However, this Court finds that
evidence presented by the FTC strongly suggests that much of the savings anticipated from the
mergers could also be achieved through continued competition in the wholesale industry. While
it must be conceded that the mergers would likely yield cost savings more immediately, the
history of the industry over the past ten years demonstrates the power of competition to lower
cost structures and garner efficiencies as well.").
82. See Berry, supra note 62, at 548 ("For example, the merger may involve a matching of
resources not achievable through internal expansion.").
83. See Vernail, supranote 37, at 134.
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simply contribute to an increased profit margin for the corporation.
The benefit is most simplistically articulated as a price decrease,
although other impacts such as improved quality or product variety
available to consumers also would fulfill this requirement. 84
Interestingly, the 1997 Guidelines do not mention explicitly a
consumer pass-through requirement.85 They do, however, acknowledge
that efficiencies have the potential to decrease prices or increase
product quality or variety; 86 thus an immediate price decrease is not
always expected.87 The courts, in contrast, often apply a consumer
pass-through test to efficiency claims.88 The criterion is so difficult to
prove that former FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky labeled it a
"killer qualification,"89 ensuring that efficiencies will never make a
difference in merger analysis.
II. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE: INCREASED ADMINISTRATIVE
SCRUTINY OF M&A DEALS

Although intellectually troubling, the courts' inconsistent
treatment of efficiency claims has not substantively affected the level

84. See Piraino, supra note 13, at 800 ("[Slubstantial economic benefits accrue even when
firms do not lower their prices after a merger. Firms may, for example, use cost savings to fund
increased spending on research and development, information technology, upgrades to plant and
equipment, and other productivity improvements. Such investments benefit consumers, workers,
investors, and local communities, and they promote the long-run economic welfare of our entire
society.").
85. See Deborah A. Garza, Is the Past Prologue? A Comparative Analysis of the Clinton
Antitrust Program and Suggestions of Changes to Come, ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at 64, 65
("When they were issued, the efficiencies guidelines also appeared to be significant for what they
did not do. They did not explicitly require parties to prove that efficiency savings will be passed
on to consumers in the form of lower prices.").
86. See 1997 REVISIONS, supra note 2, § 4 ("Efficiencies generated through merger can
enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices,
improved quality, or new products.").
87. See id. ("Efficiencies also may result in benefits in the form of new or improved
products, and efficiencies may result in benefits even when price is not immediately and directly
affected.").
88. See, e.g., FTC v. Univ. Health Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Because of
these difficulties, we hold that a defendant who seeks to overcome a presumption that a proposed
acquisition would substantially lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended
acquisition would result in significant economies and that these economies ultimately would
benefit competition, and, hence, consumers."); FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 172
(D.D.C. 2000) ("The savings that will be passed on to the consumers in the form of lower prices in
this case is at best speculative."); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1084-85
(D. Del. 1991) ("The Court's finding is guided, in part, by the reality that even if the merger
resulted in efficiency gains, there are no guarantees that these savings would be passed on to the
consuming public.").
89. Pitofsky, supra note 37, at 207.
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or character of M&A activity in the United States.90 Over the past ten
years, the low level of Section 7 enforcement activity has resulted in
almost all mergers proceeding, regardless of whether they create procompetitive efficiencies or not. 91 The Obama Administration, however,
has signaled that stricter scrutiny of deals in concentrated markets is
likely. As the pendulum swings back towards more aggressive
antitrust enforcement, the importance of consistent efficiency analysis
grows. Unless courts include the projected impact of merger-generated
efficiencies on market dynamics, future enforcement proceedings will
block pro-competitive deals.
A. The Obama Administration
The U.S. economy has had a healthy rate of M&A activity over
the last thirty years, despite the inattention paid to efficiencies in
Section 7 cases. Efficiencies have not played a large role in court
decisions regarding Section 7 preliminary injunctions, at least in part
because it was not necessary for them to do so.
The George W. Bush Administration took a very permissive
view of mergers and acquisitions. 92 Only the most egregious
transactions were prosecuted. In such contexts efficiencies are simply
less relevant. If almost all mergers are approved, whether they create
more competitive organizations or not, there is less need to identify
the truly efficient deals. 93 Implementation of antitrust policy, however,

90. See generally GAUGHAN, supra note 16, at 3-11 (providing an overview of recent M&A
trends).
91. See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at 29, 30 (asserting that in the past
ten years U.S. merger enforcement-particularly that led by the DOJ-has become too lax).
92. See id. at 29; Robert Pitofsky, Roundtable Discussion Advice for the New
Administration, ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at 8, 10 (2008) ("With respect to mergers, I've
already said that the statistics show that we are at a very low level of merger enforcement at the
DOJ. The FTC is about where it usually is. I think that most lawyers think that the chance of
getting a merger through review and cleared without challenge is vastly better today than it was
ten years ago."); Obama, supra note 5, at 2 ("Regrettably, the current administration has what
may be the weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the last half
century.").
93. See Conrath & Widnell, supra note 23, at 686 ("Thus, merger efficiencies generally have
been well recognized within merger law by imposing more stringent standards for proving a
merger anticompetitive; there remains, however, the issue of whether, and how, antitrust law
recognizes specific efficiencies in individual cases."). Note that this is the horizontal merger
enforcement policy that some Chicago School scholars consider optimal. Id. Due to concerns
about the courts' ability to properly weigh efficiencies, as well as a general disbelief in the
anticompetitive impacts of most mergers, scholars such as Richard Posner would eliminate the
efficiency defense and increase the concentration levels at which mergers raise antitrust
concerns. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 112 (1st ed. 1976). This is the direction that
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shifts with each new administration. 94 In particular, recent
Democratic administrations have taken a more aggressive stance
regarding horizontal mergers. 95
During his campaign, President Obama clearly identified that
part of his agenda included "reinvigorat[ing] antitrust enforcement." 96
In a statement to the American Antitrust Institute during his
campaign, then-Senator Obama noted that
[alt home, for more than a century, there has been broad bipartisan support for vigorous
antitrust enforcement, to protect competition and to foster innovation and economic
growth. Regrettably, the current administration has what may be the weakest record of
antitrust enforcement of any administration in the last half-century. As president, I will
direct my administration to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement. It will step up review of
merger activity and take effective action to stop or restructure those mergers that are
97
likely to harm consumer welfare, while quickly clearing those that do not.

Signs of stricter antitrust enforcement have already emerged. 98
On May 11, 2009, Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General for
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, spoke to the Center for American

U.S. policy has moved over the last ten years as reflected in the most recent revision to the HHI
Categories. See 2010 REVISIONS, supra note 6, § 5.3.
94.

See MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 114 (4th ed.

1997) ("There remains, however, a concern that enforcement priorities shift too sharply with
each new Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Chair of the FTC, and,
of course, with each new administration. Although shifts in emphasis may reflect desirable
flexibility and a healthy concern about new developments, serious questions may be raised about
ad hoc case selection and sharply shifting priorities.").
95. During the Clinton Administration, both agencies were more inclined to litigate merger
cases. Patterson, supra note 21, at 72 ("The Clinton Administration antitrust agencies
successfully brought antitrust back 'on stage.' "). Although the increased level of antitrust
activity was at least in part due to an increased number of underlying merger transactions, the
figures also reveal a more aggressive agency stance than in the prior administration. See id. at
71-72.

96.

Obama, supra note 5, at 2.

97.

Id.

98. Commentators have noted that President Obama's appointees have leanings toward
behavioral economics, which could significantly impact antitrust enforcement under the new
administration. See, e.g., Neil R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Obama's FTC: Merger Analysis to
Become Exercise in Hindsight?, 241 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3 (2009) ("The application of behavioral
economics to merger analysis by the FTC and DOJ under Clayton Act Sec. 7 risks expanding the
scope of agency review to reach transactions that were previously unassailable and imposing
substantial costs without improving the predictive quality of agency merger review."); Tamara
Lytle, Obama's New Antitrust Rules Have Big, Powerful Companies Sweating, U.S. NEWS &
20,
2009), http://politics.usnews.cominews/nationallarticles/
WORLD REPORT.COM (May
("The
2009/05/20/obamas-new-antitrust-rules-have-big-powerful-companies-sweating.html
Obama administration has swept away policy after policy from the Bush administration, and the
top antitrust regulator, Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney, made it clear in her first
speech this week that she's coming in with a very big broom.").
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Progress. 99 In her speech, she stressed the importance of vigorous
antitrust policy, particularly in troubled economic times. 00 In addition
to outlining how the DOJ intends to step up enforcement efforts,
Varney officially withdrew an earlier DOJ report issued under the
George W. Bush Administration that outlined an extremely
conservative approach to enforcing Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 101
Her statements and actions made clear that the private sector should
expect more aggressive antitrust enforcement in the years to come. 102
B. The Ongoing FinancialCrisis
The research for this Article was conducted during the first
twelve months of the financial crisis that began to affect the U.S.
economy in 2008. This dramatic economic incident significantly
affected public opinion regarding the ethics of corporate behavior.
Typically, in times of economic crisis the government reduces its
enforcement of antitrust policy in order to stabilize and rebuild the
economy. While some could argue that this pattern has re-emerged
(witness, for example, the quick approval of many bank mergers),
there is reason to believe that this crisis is different.
Unlike prior financial meltdowns, the most recent crisis has
been blamed, at least in part, on the lack of proper antitrust
enforcement and growing market concentration in the financial sector.
This theme-that the United States permitted institutions to become
"too big to fail," typically via mergers and acquisitions-is present in
many of the articles and books that have been written about the

99. Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for
the Center for American Progress: Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era (May
11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711.pdf.
100. See id. at 4 ("Thurman Arnold's legacy of vigorous antitrust enforcement was thus a
cornerstone of the New Deal's economic agenda and a part of that era's legacy for modern
economic policy. The lessons learned from this historical example are twofold. First, there is no
adequate substitute for a competitive market, particularly during times of economic distress.
Second, vigorous antitrust enforcement must play a significant role in the Government's
response to economic crises to ensure that markets remain competitive.").
101. See id. at 8 ("For these reasons, I hereby withdraw the Section 2 Report by the
Department of Justice. Thus, effective today, May 11, 2009, the Section 2 Report no longer
represents the policy of the Department of Justice with regard to antitrust enforcement under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Report and its conclusions should not be used as guidance by
courts, antitrust practitioners, and the business community.").
102. See id. at 5 ("As antitrust enforcers, we cannot sit on the sidelines any longer-both in
terms of enforcing the antitrust laws and contributing to sound competition policy as part of our
nation's economic strategy.").
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recession. 103 Current widespread fears of the "dangers" of big business,
combined with public support for increased regulation, politically
support more aggressive interpretation and enforcement of antitrust
policy.104
The 1997 Guidelines categorize markets with post-merger
105
In
concentration levels of 1,800 or more to be highly concentrated.
these markets, the Guidelines state that transactions that increase
the HHI level by fifty or more points raise significant competitive
concerns.10 6 Yet, the case analysis discussed in Part I of this Article
reveals that the Agencies actually bring very few cases that involve
concentration levels this low. Instead the Agencies appear mainly to
be pursuing preliminary injunctions for transactions that generate
HHI concentration figures in the 3,000 to 4,000+ level. Interestingly,
the Agencies are in a position to implement a more aggressive
antitrust agenda, even without changing existing written policy.
Simply enforcing the Guidelines would bring a significant shift in
M&A regulatory activity.

C. The Grid Analysis Revisited
Any administrative attempts to block M&A deals involving
lower levels of market concentration cause efficiency concerns to gain,
critical importance. Increased scrutiny of M&A deals is not necessarily
harmful to our economy. Some deals have the potential to lessen
competition and should be stopped. Others, however, that are based
on substantial synergies could actually increase competition. If the
Agencies begin blocking deals at lower levels of market concentration,
it is imperative that both the Agencies and the courts focus on sorting
out the truly efficient transactions from the rest. Failure to do so
would hinder the competitiveness of U.S. companies in concentrated
markets.

103. See, e.g., ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, Too BIG To FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES (2009);
GARY H. STERN, ET AL., TOO BIG To FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (2009).
104. See Daniel A. Crane, Obama's Antitrust Agenda 3 (Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 165, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1474957.
105. 1997 REVISIONS, supra note 2, § 1.51. Since this Article was originally drafted, the 2010
revised Guidelines have redefined "highly concentrated markets" to be those markets with a
post-merger HHI concentration level of 2500 or more. 2010 REVISIONS, supra note 6, § 5.3. The
increased HHI figure of 2500, however, is still well below the market concentration levels at
which the Agencies have historically instituted judicial proceedings.
106. Id.
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Revisiting the grid from Part I of this Article helps to illustrate
why, especially in the current economic and political climate,
consistent judicial analysis of efficiencies is critical. Increased Agency
enforcement activity would generate more preliminary injunction
actions involving mergers in "medium" concentrated markets (that is,
those markets with resulting HHI levels of 2,000-3,000). Currently,
very few cases fall within these types of markets, so little precedent
exists for merging parties to observe. Table 6 illustrates how these
cases would be categorized in the grid analysis.
Table 6: Impact of Increased Antitrust Enforcement
Concentration
Low (HHI < 2,000) 1Me(
bfl

Country Lake
Carilion Health
Long Island

.3,000)] High (HHI > 3,000)

Butterworth

Tenet Health
rI~

OMercy

4 Oracle

Health

Swedish Match
Cardinal Health
Univ. Health
Alliant Tech
Heinz
PPG
Libbey
United Tate
CCC
Rockford
Staples
Franklin

If courts had consistently recognized efficiencies, irrespective of
the underlying market concentration levels, corporations in these
newly challenged transactions would have better visibility into the
likelihood of their deals being blocked. While these organizations
would still have to guess how the court would weigh the procompetitive effects of projected efficiencies against the anticompetitive
effects of increased concentration, they would at least have some sense
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of which types of efficiencies are likely to be included in this analysis.
Because courts have not been consistent in their recognition of
efficiencies, however, merging parties now have to project not only
how the court will balance perceived pro- and anticompetitive effects
of their deal, but also whether the court is likely to recognize the
claimed efficiencies as legitimate in the first place. This increased
uncertainty raises the level of risk associated with organizations
proceeding with the transaction.
The transparency and consistency of Section 7 determinations
is essential for the U.S. merger and acquisition market to function
most effectively.107 Although the vast majority of mergers proceed
without raising antitrust issues,1 08 corporations in concentrated
markets need a concrete understanding of what factors the Agencies
and courts will consider and how they will weigh them. Without this
understanding, organizations have great difficulty judging whether
contemplated actions will run afoul of the Clayton Act.109
III. THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES ON
CORPORATE M&A NEGOTIATION DECISIONS

For over fifty years, law and economics scholars have analyzed
antitrust policy using microeconomic market models and econometric
tools. Law and economics, however, is not the only lens through which
Section 7 Clayton Act cases can be viewed. This Part applies
frameworks from the negotiation field to analyze how, in a regime of
stricter antitrust enforcement, judicial treatment of the efficiency
defense affects individual corporate M&A negotiation decisions." 0
When considered in the aggregate, these individual corporate

107. Piraino, supra note 13, at 805 ("Without clear guidance, business executives are more
likely to miscalculate, avoiding transactions that could promote the productivity of the American
economy and pursuing mergers that are harmful to consumers.").
108. Pitofsky, supra note 33, at 1413.
109. Piraino, supra note 13, at 786 ("The courts and agencies have developed a checklist of
relevant factors to consider, but they have been unable to define when particular factors should
be dispositive of a merger's legality. As a result, the courts and agencies have become more likely
to miscalculate either by allowing anticompetitive mergers to proceed or by precluding
transactions beneficial to consumers. This lack of clear guidance from the courts and agencies
has left both practitioners and business executives confused as to the legality of particular
mergers.").
110. A recent report issued by the Bureau of Economics at the FTC analyzes how the Agency
treats efficiency claims in second request investigations. MALCOLM B. COATE & ANDREW J.
HEIMERT, ECONOMIC ISSUES: MERGER EFFICIENCIES AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 19972007 4, n.11 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf. Between 1997 and
2006 the agency issued 319 second requests. Id. An interesting issue, beyond the scope of this
Article, is how court decisions affect Agency negotiations during the HSR process.
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decisions affect the size, shape, and character of U.S. M&A activity in
concentrated markets. This Part also demonstrates how inconsistent
judicial treatment of efficiencies will reduce the volume of M&A deals
and lead to the abandonment of those deals with the greatest potential
to enhance competition through synergies and efficiencies.
A. Impact of JudicialInconsistency on Volume of Deal Flow
A central question that all negotiators face when putting
together deals is whether they should accept the other side's final
offer. Is it a good deal? Will the negotiation be considered a success?
Current negotiation theory suggests a variety of factors that
negotiators can assess to determine the answer to this critical
question.111 Does the deal satisfy the organization's key interests?
Have the negotiators explored all potential value-creating options? Is
the agreement durable? One of the key questions to ask is what the
organization will do if they do not come to an agreement. Of all of the
possible alternatives to this particular deal, which one is most
attractive? A negotiator's best alternative to a negotiated agreement is
referred to as their "BATNA."11 2 Modern negotiation literature
recommends that negotiators both identify their BATNA and take any
feasible steps to improve it.113
Sometimes a negotiator's BATNA will be concrete. For
example, if I am negotiating the sale of my 2001 Subaru Outback to
my local dealer, I may know that my best alternative to this deal is to
sell the car to my neighbor for $3,600, assuming that my neighbor has
agreed to such an arrangement. In other situations, such as
settlement negotiations in litigation contexts, one's BATNA can
involve greater levels of uncertainty.114 When an entity's BATNA
involves uncertain events, many organizations use decision trees to
aid in BATNA analysis, as they provide a logical way to map out and
assess the likelihood and "predicted value" of different potential
outcomes.1i5
111. Bruce Patton, Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 279, 285-86
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
112. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 99-100 (2d ed. 1991).
113. See, e.g., id. at 103-05; LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 26
(1998).
114. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, ScOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 109-11 (2000) (discussing how decision
trees can be used in litigation contexts to determine the expected value of a case).
115. For a practical explanation of how to use decision tree analysis to support negotiation
choices, see Marjorie Corman Aaron, Finding Settlement with Numbers, Maps, and Trees, in THE
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BATNA and decision analysis tools provide an interesting lens
through which to evaluate the impact of current judicial treatment of
efficiency defense doctrine on individual corporate M&A negotiation
decisions. A corporation contemplating an acquisition that potentially
raises Section 7 issues must decide whether to move forward with the
negotiated deal or to proceed with their BATNA (that is, either to take
no action or to explore other potential transactions).116 In an M&A
context, proceeding with the acquisition deal can involve significant
uncertainty. Specifically, the corporation does not know whether the
Agencies will take issue with the transaction and, if so, whether the
court will issue a preliminary injunction blocking the deal.
Although the vast majority of M&A deals do not raise antitrust
18
concerns,1 17 for those that do, this uncertainty can be devastating.
Once a potential deal is announced, employees, customers, and
shareholders are all generally anxious about the impact of the
transaction. While the merging organizations can address some of the
issues raised through proactive and consistent communication, they
are not in a position to take unified action-such as announcing which
managers will head new merged departments, issuing new pricing
lists, or shutting down manufacturing facilities-until the transaction
has closed.1 19
The longer the waiting period extends-either due to an HSR
second request or a trial regarding a preliminary injunction-the
greater the risk the corporation faces of losing key employees, key
customers, and general business momentum. Such distraction is a
significant issue. Few managers and employees can maintain full
focus on their normal business goals and tasks when massive
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 202, 202-18 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds.,
2005). See also Jeffrey M. Senger, Decision Analysis in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 72335 (2004).
116. Many corporations that face pre-merger challenges will either abandon the deal or
attempt to negotiate a settlement with the Agency. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 580.
117. See Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Efficiencies and Antitrust: A
Story of Ongoing Evolution (Nov. 8, 2002), 2002 WL 31512400, at *16.
118. In order to protect and build the value of the merging organizations, the postmerger
integration process must proceed as quickly as possible. Any type of uncertainty injected into the
process, whether from antitrust concerns or other issues, can be devastating. See Ronald N.
Ashkenas, Lawrence J. Demonaco & Suzanne C. Francis, Making the Deal Real: How GE Capital
Integrates Acquisitions, 176 HARV. BUS. REV. 165, 172 (1998) ("Decisions about management
structure, key roles, reporting relationships, layoffs, restructuring, and other career-affecting
aspects of the integration should be made, announced, and implemented as soon as possible after
the deal is signed-within days if possible. Creeping changes, uncertainty, and anxiety that last
for months are debilitating and immediately start to drain value from an acquisition.").
119. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 584 (discussing limitations that exist on
sharing confidential business information and shifting beneficial control of the acquired company
before a merger deal closes).
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organizational change looms in the future. For this reason, most
transactions are abandoned if challenged by the government. 120 Even
worse, preliminary injunctions are generally considered to be "deal
killers."121
Transparency is, therefore, critical. When assessing whether to
move forward with a proposed deal, corporate negotiators need as
much insight as possible as to how both the Agencies and the courts
will evaluate their transaction. 122 In recent years the Agencies have
recognized this issue and have taken great strides to provide more
information.123 As the case analysis in Part I illustrates however,
courts have not.
When recognition of similar efficiencies varies depending upon
the context of the case, the uncertainty facing corporate negotiators
magnifies. This is particularly true if merging parties are involved in a
transaction involving a "medium" concentrated market (that is,
resulting HHI of 2,000-3,000) for which little judicial precedent exists.
In addition to hypothesizing how the court might balance the
anticompetitive and pro-competitive efficiencies of the deal, corporate
negotiators also must guess whether the underlying efficiencies
themselves will be recognized.
When comparing the specific acquisition deal on the table with
their BATNA, corporate negotiators are logically going to discount the
value of the potential deal based on all of the risk factors involved. The
more opportunities that exist to derail a proposed deal, the greater the

120. Pitofsky, supra note 37, at 225.
121. In FTC v. CCC Holdings, the Court noted that "[t]he merging parties suggest they will
abandon the merger if an injunction issues, in part because financing would be too difficult to
maintain during the administrative process." 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2009); see also
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supranote 9, at 587 (when a preliminary injunction is issued "the parties to
the transaction generally abandon it, choosing not to litigate further").
122. See Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Reflections in An Election
Year: Challenges in Antitrust Enforcement (Jan. 31, 2008), 2008 WL 699053, at *2 ("Time and
again, business people have said to me, 'We can handle rules; we just need as much certainty as
possible about what they are.' Each case, appropriately brought, represents another opportunity
to explicate the rules.") (emphasis added).
123. For example, in 2006 the FTC and DOJ released a new report, which explains current
Agency frameworks and analysis and provide case examples. FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, at v (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.pdf ("Today, to provide greater transparency
and foster deeper understanding regarding antitrust law enforcement, the Agencies jointly issue
this Commentary on the Guidelines. The Commentary continues the Agencies' ongoing efforts to
increase the transparency of their decisionmaking processes."). See also WILLIAM E. KOVACIC,
CHAIRMAN, FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED

STATES: CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE?, 2008 WL 2311121, at *15 (June 2, 2008) (discussing
how the United States has begun to emulate the E.U. system in providing more transparency to
the public regarding why the FTC has chosen not to prosecute a particular case).
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underlying value of the deal itself must be for corporate negotiators to
move forward. The courts' inconsistent recognition of efficiencies adds
uncertainty to the picture. This uncertainty increases the risk
associated with proceeding forward with the merger, thus affecting
individual corporations' decisions regarding planned transactions. 124
On an aggregate basis, corporations in concentrated markets will end
up abandoning more deals than they otherwise would if courts were
more consistent with their recognition of efficiency claims. 12 5
Therefore, some value-creating, competition-enhancing acquisitions
will not take place.
Another way to conceptualize the impact of court-generated
uncertainty on deal flow is through the use of Zone of Possible
Agreement ("ZOPA") analyses. Not all negotiations end in an
agreement. Many barriers may prevent a deal, such as strategic
behavior; information asymmetries; agency issues; and psychological
barriers such as optimistic overconfidence, loss aversion, and reactive
devaluation.126
In some cases a deal does not occur because each party has a
BATNA that is stronger than any possible offer from the other side. In
such cases, there is no ZOPA between the parties. Graphically, one
can represent the ZOPA that exists in a negotiation as the area
between each party's reservation price-the price at which they are
indifferent between the offer on the table and their BATNA.1 27 Any
deal to which the negotiators agree within these parameters is better
for each of them than their respective BATNAs.

124. Given the courts' hostile and inconsistent treatment of efficiencies, some antitrust
attorneys actually advise their clients to forgo trying to make their best efficiency case. See
Timothy Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Understanding Mergers: Strategy and Planning,
Implementation, and Outcomes (Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris
/mergers021209.shtm. Such advice not only adds uncertainty to the decision tree, but actually
makes certain branches impossible to reach.
125. Attorneys are very focused on the question of whether they can "get [the] deal done."
Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust and Enhancing Efficiency, ANTITRUST, Summer 1997, at 4, 4.
Inconsistent treatment of efficiencies makes it more difficult to answer this question
affirmatively. Id.
126. Ronald L. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword to Symposium, Business Lawyers and
Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1995); see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lee
Ross, Introduction to BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 15-18 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds.,
1995) (discussing the psychological barriers).
127. See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND STRATEGY 27-49 (2d ed. 2009);
HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 45-46 (1982); Michael L. Moffitt, Disputes
at Opportunities to Create Value, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 173, 175-76
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
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Buyer's Reservation Price

ZONE OF
POSSIBLE AGREEMENT
(the lowest price
the seller would accept)

(the highest price
the buyer would pay)

It is easiest to conceptualize a ZOPA if the negotiation focuses
on only one variable, such as price. When other elements are added
into the mix (for example, timing of deal or payment structure), it is
more difficult to graphically illustrate the range of possible
agreements that exist; conceptually, however, there is still a concrete
range of options that are better than each party's BATNA-assuming
that a ZOPA exists.
Applying this analysis to Section 7 Clayton Act cases reveals
the impact on M&A negotiations of courts' inconsistent treatment of
efficiencies. Part I of this Article highlighted how courts' bimodal
treatment of efficiency claims hinders corporations' abilities to predict
reasonably whether the court will recognize the projected synergies or
savings from their proposed transaction. This lack of transparency
increases the uncertainty associated with proposed mergers in
concentrated markets, thus causing corporate negotiators to discount
the value of potential deals vis-A-vis their BATNAs. The increased
uncertainty effectively moves the two organizations' reservation prices
closer together, either reducing the size of, or potentially eliminating,
the previously existing ZOPA. The net effect is to reduce the flow of
M&A deals, in many cases eliminating transactions that could have
helped to improve market competitiveness.
For example, if Corporation A is attempting to acquire
Corporation B and there is significant uncertainty as to whether the
deal will be blocked, Corporation A is not going to be willing to pay as
much for Corporation B as it otherwise would. If it would be willing to
pay $25 per share in a risk-free environment, it may only be willing to
pay $22 per share given the uncertainties involved. Why the reduced
price? It is because the uncertainty creates two real costs. The first
cost is the risk that Corporation A will spend enormous time and
energy on the proposed transaction, only to have it blocked. Even if
there is only a small chance that this occurs, the share price that
Corporation A is willing to offer must reflect the cost of this risk.
The second cost relates to the hidden expenses associated with
uncertainty. Most obviously, a second HSR request or litigation
surrounding a preliminary injunction involves additional transaction
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costs. 128 It also extends the time period between the public
announcement of the deal and the closing. As discussed earlier, the
longer the period of uncertainty, the greater the risk of negative
impacts on employees, customers, and general business momentum.
These factors must also be considered in the reservation price for the
deal.
Corporation B faces similar issues. If in a risk-free
environment it would be willing to accept payment of $20 per share for
its stock, it is going to demand higher compensation when the level of
uncertainty increases. Corporation B risks suffering lost transaction
costs if the deal fails to go through. If the acquisition agreement
includes any type of earn-out or contingent-price clause, it also risks
making less on the deal if delays and uncertainty caused by second
requests or litigation hurt the value of the ongoing business.
Corporation B will, therefore, demand a higher sale price than
otherwise necessary in a risk-free environment to move forward with
the transaction. For example, it may demand $23 per share rather
than $20 per share.
What impact do these uncertainties have on the deal? Given
the original parameters in this hypothetical scenario, a fairly broad
ZOPA existed between the two companies' reservation prices of $25
per share and $20 per share. A number of deals could have been
struck providing each organization with more value than their
BATNA.
Once the cost of increased uncertainty is included in the
analysis, however, the ZOPA effectively disappears. Corporation A is
only willing to pay $22 per share while Corporation B is demanding at
least $23 per share. There is no longer room for a deal. Each
corporation is better off with its BATNA. The risks associated with the
deal have eliminated the potential for a transaction that, absent the
uncertainty, would have created considerable value for each side.
Corporation A's
Reservation Price

Corporation B's
Reservation Price

$22
$23
NO ZONE OF
POSSIBLE AGREEMENT

128. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 583.
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Obviously, all transactions involve risk. The hypothetical
scenario's analysis of a risk-free transaction is simplistic for the
purpose of highlighting this fundamental dynamic. Conceptually,
however, the ZOPA impact of moving from some risk to considerably
more risk is similar to the impact described above. On an individual
basis, it means that M&A negotiators will end up walking away from
deals that otherwise could create value for both organizations.
On a macro level, each of these individual negotiator decisions,
when aggregated, can lead to the sub-optimal functioning of M&A
activity in concentrated markets. A broad swath of deals that would
make U.S. companies more competitive will never occur. The
uncertainty forces businesses to forego deals that, under a regime of
more transparent and consistent court action, would have taken place
and would have benefited both sides. The impact, therefore, is felt
both in the increased number of deals the courts halt and-even more
substantially-the increased number of value-creating deals that are
never pursued due to fear that they might raise antitrust concerns.
B. Impact of JudicialInconsistency on Characterof Deal Flow
The traditional view of negotiation is best described as a zerosum haggle. 129 A simple case illustrates this point. Assume that Acme
Corp. is looking for a particular piece of used industrial equipment
needed for a new manufacturing facility; it discovers that Beta Inc., a
local company, has the equipment at a nearby plant. If the only
variable under negotiation is price, every dollar or concession that
Acme wins, Beta loses. If Beta agrees to lower the price by $350,000,
Acme gains because Beta has agreed to give up $350,000. This
interaction is described as "zero-sum" due to the two entities' collective
inability to do anything more than decide how to allocate a fixed set of
resources between themselves. 130
Over the last thirty years, scholars in the negotiation field have
put forth an alternative model for describing and analyzing more
complex negotiations. This integrative framework1 31 suggests that
negotiators often perceive negotiations to be zero-sum that are in fact

129. See FISHER, URY, & PATTON, supra note 112, at 3-4 (illustrating such a traditional
negotiation).
130. For a discussion of how negotiators are often trapped in a "zero-sum mindset," see
MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 114, at 168; THOMPSON, supra note 113, at 113.
131. See MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 67-76 (1992);
MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 114, at 254-71; HOWARD RAIFFA WITH JOHN
RICHARDSON & DAVID METCALFE, NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE & ART OF
COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 195--212 (2002); Patton, supra note 111, at 279-85.
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not. 132 Opportunities exist to use the negotiation process not only to
split up a fixed set of resources, but also to see if ways exist for
negotiators collectively to identify options that might enlarge the
resources jointly available to them or to split the resources in a way
that increases the value to each side.
For example, in the scenario described above, in addition to
getting as much money for the equipment as possible, it is conceivable
that the executives from Beta have a few other important interests.
Beta may still have a few weeks of manufacturing runs scheduled in
the nearby plant, so although it would like to finalize an agreement to
sell the equipment as soon as possible, Beta would rather not transfer
ownership of the machinery until the end of the month. Beta may also
be facing some type of cash crisis. Although the total amount of money
that Beta receives for the equipment is important, it may be willing to
reduce the final sale price in order to obtain a cash advance.
Depending upon Acme's situation, it may not be very costly for
it to accommodate Beta on some of the things that Beta values. If
Acme's new manufacturing facility will not begin operations for a few
weeks, Acme may be willing to postpone the actual transfer of
ownership of the equipment, if it would receive a discount on the sale
price. If the two companies can jointly craft an option that addresses
this concern and which each would find superior to a simple straight
sale, they have created value. 133
Similarly, it is possible that Acme's cash flow situation may
allow it to forward a portion of the sales price in advance as part of the
deal. If this accommodation were possible, Acme may be willing to
agree to this term as part of the overall deal, particularly if Beta
would compensate Acme at a rate greater than it is currently earning
in its investment accounts. By exploring creative options to address
each of these issues-the date on which title of the equipment
transfers and an advance of funds-the two companies have created
value.
Recent negotiation literature provides a useful framework for
identifying opportunities to create value when negotiating deals. 134
Specifically, parties can look for creative options that (1) leverage

132. See BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 131, at 16-22.
133. Economists analyze potential deals by determining the total "utility" that each
negotiator assigns to the various options available to them. Options that increase one party's
total utility without reducing the other party's total utility create value as they enlarge the total
utility points that can be divided between the parties. For an applied discussion of pareto
optimality, see RAIFFA, supra note 127, at 135-42.
134. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 88-112 (1986); Moffitt, supranote 127, at 176-81.
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economies of scale;135 (2) identify shared interests;136 (3) take
advantage of differences in resources, capabilities, relative valuations,
predictions, risk preferences, and time horizons;137 and (4) minimize
transactions costs and moral hazards.1 38 These opportunities enable
negotiators to maximize the potential value of a deal before it is
distributed between the parties and to achieve the "win/win" to which
people so often refer.
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, the value creation
framework from the negotiation field provides a useful tool to analyze
potential deals. If one looks at a potential acquisition or merger
through a zero-sum bargaining lens, the negotiation dynamics appear
quite simple. Putting aside agency and multi-party issues,139 the
critical question appears to be how much Corporation A will pay for
Corporation B's stock or assets. Every dollar more that Corporation A
pays is a dollar gained for Corporation B's shareholders. Likewise,
every dollar less that Corporation A pays comes out of the pockets of
Corporation B's shareholders.
Although distributional aspects of an M&A deal certainly exist,
there are at least two points in time when sophisticated negotiators
can move the discussion out of the zero-sum realm. The first is when
the attorneys are negotiating the M&A agreement.140 In addition to
designating a particular sales price, a well-drafted document also
creates value by reducing the many transaction costs and risks of the
deal.141 For example, well-crafted representations and warranties,
accompanied by indemnification clauses, reduce the risk of

135. LAX & SEBENIUS, supranote 134, at 88-112.
136. Id.; Moffitt, supra note 127, at 176-81.
137. LAx & SEBENIUS, supranote 134, at 88-112; Moffitt, supranote 127, at 176-81.
138. Moffitt, supra note 127, at 176-81.
139. These are obviously important factors that contribute to the overall negotiation
dynamic. Agency issues arise when corporate officers and board members with differing interests
are involved in the negotiation process. For an in-depth analysis of how principallagent issues
can affect negotiation dynamics, see MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 114, at 69-91.
140. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 4-5 (2003) ("[P]eople hire
transactional lawyers because they add value to the deal. This conception of the lawyer's role
rejects the zero sum game mentality. Instead, it claims that the lawyer makes everybody better
off by increasing the size of the pie .... For the most part, lawyers increase the size of the pie by
reducing transaction costs.").
141. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 40 ("The returns on even a mediocre deal can be
enhanced for the buyer through artful deal design."); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) ("I suggest that
the tie between legal skills and transaction value is the business lawyer's ability to create a
transactional structure which reduces transaction costs and therefore results in more accurate
asset pricing.").
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misinformation between sellers and buyers. 142 Earn-out or contingentpricing agreements help negotiators come to an agreement when
buyers and sellers have differing forecasts regarding future
performance. 143 Covenants help ensure that the two parties' incentives
remain aligned during the period between the time when the merger
agreement is negotiated and the transaction closes. Each of these
structural agreements helps reduce risk and thus increases the value
of the deal.
A second point in time when value creation occurs is much
earlier in the deal-making process. If the transaction is analyzed from
the point in time when Corporation A initially decided that it would
like to explore an acquisition, the company can create additional value
by identifying the best target acquisition.
When firms decide to make an acquisition, they usually do not
immediately single out a particular firm to purchase. Instead, they
generally engage in a lengthy and in-depth scanning and evaluation
process to identify potential targets and assess their value. 144 The
acquirer is not simply looking to understand the intrinsic worth of
potential targets. In the case of public companies, this calculation
would be a fairly straightforward analysis, if one accepts market value
as a reasonable proxy for stand-alone worth.
Instead, what companies are analyzing are potential synergies.
If the two companies were to merge their operations, what synergies
or efficiencies might be attained? How could they use their different
resources, capabilities, relationships, and intangible assets to operate
more effectively as one combined unit? Through the lens of negotiation
theory, acquirers are engaging in one of the value creation phases of
negotiation. They are attempting to "enlarge the pie" before they
negotiate over how big of a piece each entity is going to get.
Applying the value creation framework from the negotiation
literature to the M&A context highlights the numerous potential

142. See Gilson, supra note 141, at 280-82 (discussing the use of information-sharing and
indemnification to add value to deals).
143. Id. at 263 ("[TLhere is a familiar remedy, commonly called an 'earnout' or 'contingent
price' deal, for this failure of the homogeneous-expectations assumption. It is intended, as a
prominent practitioner has put it, to 'bridge the negotiating gap between a seller who thinks his
business is worth more than its historical earnings justify and a purchaser who hails from
Missouri.' ") (quoting J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 205 (1975)); see also BRUNER, supra note 17, at 34 ("Two
studies have reported that the returns to buyers are higher when the payment is structured to be
contingent on meeting future performance benchmarks.").
144. See Gilson, supra note 141, at 271 (commenting on the information asymmetry that
remains between a seller and a buyer even after the buyer's thorough search for targets).
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opportunities for M&A deals to create efficiencies. 14 5 Some example
places where value might be created include:
Leverage Scale Economies
Leverage manufacturing economies
Leverage existing corporate infrastructure by reducing combined staffing in general counsel's
office, human resources, IT, etc.
Leverage purchasing economies (that is, qualifying for discounts due to combined quantities of
goods purchased)
Leverage promotional/marketing economies
Leverage necessary R&D investments such as duplicative, expensive physical hardware
Identify Shared Interests
Clear, consistent, proactive communication to stakeholders (that is, employees, customers,
shareholders)
Quick HSR Merger Review Process
Take Advantage of Differences in Resources and Capabilities
Leverage each firm's unique intellectual property
Leverage strongest brands
Leverage access to less expensive capital
Leverage specialized manufacturing facilities
Identify and promote strongest managers in each area
Leverage unique R&D skills and capabilities
Take Advantage of Differences in Relative Valuations
Certain resources (for example, established distribution channels) may be worth more to
acquirer than target
Take Advantage of Differences in Projections
Acquirer may have more optimistic view of target company market (for example, future
profitability, growth rate)
Take Advantage of Differences in Risk Preferences
If acquirer is larger and more diverse, acquisition may enable management to take on more
risks (for example, if target business only represents one of many initiatives in a broad
portfolio)
Take Advantage of Differences in Time Horizons
If acquirer is a private company, acquisition may enable management to focus on long-term
4
strategic goals, rather than short-term earnings per share targets"'
Minimize Transaction Costs and Moral Hazards
Reduce time period of uncertainty
Reduce potential litigation costs
Take advantage of the merged entity's ability to operate more efficiently by conducting
7
business within the firm rather than in the marketplace14

145. There is a strong body of literature recognizing the significant synergies, or efficiencies,
that mergers can create. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 37, at 208; Gregory J. Werden, An
Economic Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies, ANTITRUST, Summer 1997, at 12, 12
(identifying a broad range of efficiencies generated by horizontal mergers).
146. Managers of public companies often feel immense pressure to hit quarterly earningsper-share ("EPS") targets. See DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR

LAWYERS 538-39 (4th ed. 2006) (excerpting Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,
The "Numbers Game," Remarks at the NYU Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch22O.txt.).
147. Economists label this source of value "transactional efficiencies." See Coate, supra note
8, at 191 ("The New Institutional Economist (Institutionalist) would accept the neoclassical
analysis and add another layer of efficiencies defined by reductions in the transaction costs
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Sophisticated businesses engage in this value creation process
as they look for potential acquisition targets that best match their own
organization's skills, capabilities, people, and resources. In the end,
the acquirer is likely to pay a considerable premium for the company
it purchases; the only rational reason to do so is the belief that this
"cost," and more, can be recouped via synergies. 148 If not, the
transaction destroys shareholder value.
Only over time, as the acquirer learns more detailed
information about the potential target, can it best assess the
feasibility of possible synergies. Of course, not all competitive
information can be shared-at least not directly or at early stages of
the deal. 149 Merging parties must be careful not to share confidential,
competitive information directly (for example, pricing schedules) until
the deal closes, or they risk violating antitrust rules. 5 0 Much
information can be shared; however, it takes time to identify and
analyze it.
This value creation negotiation process where companies scan,
identify, analyze, and discuss potential acquisition possibilities is
extremely beneficial to the competitiveness of the U.S. economy. By
exploring differences in capabilities, resources, risk preferences, and
other opportunities for value creation, organizations are joining forces
in ways that make them more efficient and effective competitors. This
is market behavior that should be encouraged, particularly as
domestic companies face continually stronger pressure from
international entities. Only by allowing our domestic companies to
position themselves in as competitive a structure as possible can they
outperform their international peers.
The problem, however, is that many of the most important
potential synergies-those that have the ability to create the greatest
long-term value-are generally discounted in Section 7 merger

associated with the market economy. To the extent mergers reduce the transactions [sic] costs of
the relevant organizational structure, these efficiencies must be added into the merger
analysis.") (citations omitted); Williamson, supra note 62, at 723-24.
148. See GAUGHAN, supra note 16, at 124 ("The anticipated existence of synergistic benefits
allows firms to incur the expenses of the acquisition process and still be able to afford to give
target shareholders a premium for their shares. Synergy may allow the combined firm to appear
to have a positive net acquisition value (NAV)."). Note, however, that acquisition premiums
cannot always be justified by obtainable synergies and instead are sometimes better explained
by managerial hubris. Id. at 157-58.
149. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 584. Some companies do use consultants and
"clean teams" to share confidential information pre-close that is necessary for integration
planning. See John Koob, Early Warnings on Culture Clash, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEAL
MAKER'S J., July 2006, at 34, 34-37.
150. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 584.
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challenges.51 What separates good companies from great, long-lasting
organizations? It is generally not the three percent variable cost
manufacturing efficiencies most easily recognized by the Agencies and
the courts as true, verifiable efficiencies in a Section 7 challenge. 152
Instead, it is other, more strategic capabilities such as R&D strength,
innovation culture, product development skills, distributional
relationships, developed intellectual property, customer market
capabilities, or data mining skills.153 These capabilities are the
building blocks of competitive organizations.
The FTC's 1996 report, Anticipating the 21st Century:
Competition Policy in the New High Tech, Global Marketplace, noted
that in today's markets, competition is not limited to price alone;
instead organizations must compete on a variety of levels including
product development, variety, speed, and innovation. 154 In particular,
the report emphasized that innovation efficiencies can contribute
significantly to competitive dynamics.155
Ideally, U.S. antitrust policy should recognize the strength of
these valuable synergies and encourage domestic entities to leverage
them to build as competitive of organizations as possible. The FTC
report advises the Agencies to consider a broad range of efficiencies in
merger analysis, including economies of scale and plant specialization,
as well as distributional, promotional, transactional, managerial, and
innovation efficiencies.15 6 Although the Agencies may have started to
heed this advice, 15 7 the courts, unfortunately, have not. Instead they
151. See Leary, supra note 117, at *13 ("Efficiencies of this kind, whether they are called
innovation or managerial economies, are probably the most significant variable in determining
whether companies succeed or fail-or in determining whether certain more specific merger
efficiencies are achieved or not. Yet, we do not overtly take them into account when deciding
merger cases.").
152. In remarks to the ABA Section of Antitrust Law in 2002, Commissioner Leary stated,
"[I]t seems clear that we do not deal in a transparent and rigorous way with the less tangible
efficiencies, which nonetheless may be most important. We do consider them internally and
informally but discount them altogether in a contested transaction because they are often
difficult to quantify. We should do more to reconcile our public and our non-public practice." Id.
at 14.
153. See SUILIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 16 ("Economists believe that society benefits
far more (real income rates grow faster) from dynamic efficiency than from allocative
efficiency.").
154. FED. TRADE COMM'N, Executive Summary and PrincipalConclusions 1, in ANTICIPATING
THE 21ST CENTURY, supranote 38.
155. Id. ch. 1, at 32.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Muris, supra note 124, at 1 ("The antitrust bar should know . . . that
internally, [the FTC] take[s] substantial, well-documented efficiencies arguments seriously. And
we recognize that mergers can lead to a variety of efficiencies beyond reductions in variable
costs." ).
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continue to generally ignore the pro-competitive impact of these
important strategic synergies.
The private sector takes note of these rulings.16 8 In cases in
which a merger challenge is feasible, corporate boards and executives
are warier of basing their decision to merge on any long-term strategic
efficiencies. Which deals are most likely to be abandoned?
Unfortunately, those deals that are likely to be deemed too risky are
exactly those that have the greatest potential to enhance competition.
IV. How COURTS SHOULD ANALYZE EFFICIENCIES:
SOME PROPOSED GUIDELINES

Although courts have considered efficiencies in Section 7 cases
for many years, judicial treatment of the topic has been inconsistent.
This Part identifies four proposed guidelines to help courts analyze
projected synergies in a more systematic fashion.
1. Evaluate efficiencies independently of market concentration.
The grid in Part I of this Article reveals the strong link between
underlying market concentration and recognized efficiencies. With the
exception of a few hospital mergers, courts appear to only recognize
efficiencies in cases that do not involve significant market
concentration. In cases involving high market concentration, the
courts discard similar types of efficiencies. It would be theoretically
sound to find that a set of projected efficiencies justifies a merger in
one context but not in another, due to the other anticompetitive effects
of the deal, as long as this determination took place during the
balancing portion of the analysis. Unfortunately this is not what is
currently occurring in the courts. Different merger contexts appear to
be influencing whether the courts recognize the efficiencies in the first
place. The problem with the current judicial pattern is that it leads to
inconsistent recognition of efficiencies, making it less transparent to
merging parties how their transaction synergies will be treated.
Courts need to begin decoupling their efficiency and concentration
analysis.
2. Quantify efficiencies as a percentage of revenue. In
determining the appropriate product and geographic markets,
antitrust analysis focuses on the concept of "small but significant nontransitory price increases."159 Could a hypothetical profit-maximizing
158. The role of the courts in defining antitrust policy for the private sector is very
important. See A. Douglas Melamed, Comments at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Roundtable
Discussion: Advice for the New Administration (Mar. 27, 2008), in ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at
8, 11-12 (discussing the need for Agencies to define antitrust law by bringing cases).
159. 1997 REVISIONS, supra note 2, §§ 1.11, 1.21.
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monopolist raise prices profitably?160 Although the pro-competitive
benefit of quantitative efficiencies (that is, reduced variable or fixed
costs) results in downward pressure on prices, courts never talk about
the projected savings in terms that make this relationship concrete.
Generally, they simply list the projected synergies in absolute terms
(for example, $10 million per year). A useful data point for courts to
consider in their analysis is the relationship between price and
projected synergies. The impact on price of $10 million in annual cost
savings is very different for a company with $100 million of revenue
versus one with $10 billion of revenue. When balancing projected
efficiencies against increased competition, it would be useful for courts
to consider how large the recognized synergies are in relation to the
merged entity's projected revenue. Discussing this simple calculation
in written decisions would make it easier for courts and merging
parties to compare efficiency savings across transactions.
3. Recognize and weigh qualitative efficiencies in appropriate
cases. One of the most difficult challenges facing judicial efficiency
analysis is how to incorporate qualitative efficiencies (for example,
enhanced R&D capabilities, ability to leverage existing brands) into
the analysis. Although it can be difficult to measure these types of
efficiencies, they often have the greatest potential to enhance market
competition. Given these difficulties, this Article offers a few
suggestions for how courts might consider these factors.
To start, it is appropriate to require merging parties to provide
evidence of the potential pro-competitive effect of the qualitative
synergies. It is not enough for merging parties to simply state that
they will have enhanced R&D capabilities. What are the specific
capabilities? How will they interact? Why isn't this possible without
the merger? Are there any specific examples of other companies that
merged similar capabilities and saw a dramatic positive effect? What
is the range of potential likely outcomes? There are a broad range of
questions that merging parties should address, which will help to
separate legitimate expectations from fanciful hopes.
Second, it is appropriate for courts to give greater weight to
qualitative efficiencies in two specific contexts. The first is situations
in which quantitative efficiencies alone almost justify the merger and
the additional qualitative synergies tip the balance in favor of procompetitive effects. The second scenario is situations in which the
merger involves two organizations not currently holding one of the top
two dominant market positions. In these cases, the merger could help
these entities to better compete with current market leaders.
160. Id.
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4. Defer consumer pass-through considerations until the
balancing analysis. One of the three factors that courts use to discard
efficiencies as non-cognizable is the issue of "consumer pass-through."
Will merging entities pass-through transaction-related efficiencies to
consumers (either in the form of lower prices or improved products) or
will the efficiencies simply result in increased corporate profits?
Although it may seem like firms in concentrated industries would be
less likely to pass through efficiencies to consumers, fundamental
economic theory predicts otherwise. Firms are actually most likely to
pass through efficiency benefits in concentrated markets due to the
downward-facing demand curve that firms with large market share
face. 161 In other words, the increase in the quantity of goods these
firms can expect to sell when they lower prices provides them with
more profit than they would have earned by simply keeping prices
constant.162 Despite this fact, courts continue to ask the black-andwhite question of whether firms will pass through efficiencies as a
rationale for completely discarding projected efficiencies from the
competitive analysis.163 Rather than consider the question of consumer
pass-through in the recognition analysis, courts should defer this issue
161. See Paul L. Yde & Michael G. Vita, Merger Efficiencies: Reconsideringthe "Passing-On"
Requirement, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 735, 741-46 (1996) [hereinafter Yde & Vita, Reconsidering]
(advocating for the end of the "passing-on" criterion in merger analysis); Paul Yde & Michael
Vita, Merger Efficiencies: The "Passing-On"Fallacy, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 59, 59-60
[hereinafter Yde & Vita, Fallacy] (expressing frustration that recent economic analysis regarding
the "passing-on" requirement is not being incorporated into all antitrust efficiency claims
analysis). For a technical explanation of how pass-through rates are dependent upon
assumptions made about the form of demand, see also Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz & Gregory
J. Werden, Pass-ThroughRates and the Price Effects of Mergers, 23 INT'L. J. INDUS. ORG. 703,
704-09 (2005).
162. See Yde & Vita, Reconsidering, supranote 161, at 741-46. Interestingly, in recent years,
several economists have pointed out that in highly competitive markets, microeconomic theory
predicts that efficiencies would not have ended up getting passed along to consumers as one
might expect. See Yde & Vita, Fallacy, supra note 161, at 60 (discussing economists who have
analyzed the pass-through effects of concentrated versus non-concentrated industries). In such
scenarios (e.g., imagine a farmer selling wheat on a national market), the individual firm is
considered a "price taker." Since the firm can sell its entire output at the market price, it has no
incentive to reduce prices based on efficiencies. Instead, it can capture the full efficiencies as
profit. See Yde & Vita, Reconsidering, supra note 161, at 741-46.
163. FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 2002) ("Although the evidence
presented by the defendants demonstrates that there could potentially be some positive results
of the acquisition, the Court does not believe that these results outweigh the potential harm to
the market that could result given the fact that there has not been sufficient evidence to
establish how RCP will be able to compete effectively given the higher costs it will have to pay
for its glassware, and why Libbey will not use this opportunity to raise its own prices.") (emphasis
added); FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 172 (D.D.C. 2000) ("However, the
defendants' evidence on efficiencies is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of illegality in
this case. The savings that will be passed on to the consumers in the form of lower prices in this
case is at best speculative.").
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until the balancing analysis. From an economic perspective, there is
no question that firms in concentrated markets have incentives to
pass through efficiencies to consumers. The real question is what
percentage of the savings will ultimately be passed through. This is a
question of degree that should be addressed via modeling and the use
of scenarios and ranges in the balancing analysis. Courts should stop
using the consumer pass-through issue as a rationale to completely
deny initial recognition of projected efficiencies.
CONCLUSION
Although courts give lip service to the value of mergergenerated efficiencies, they consistently fail to recognize efficiencies in
close Clayton Act cases. Over the last few decades, U.S. antitrust
enforcement has grown increasingly lax. During this time frame,
almost all mergers were approved-whether pro-competitive or not.
This permissive policy masked the gap between how courts say they
are analyzing the competitive effects of proposed deals and what they
are in fact doing. However, a careful look at Section 7 judicial
decisions reveals the lack of congruence between courts' statements
and their actions.
With the shift to more aggressive antitrust enforcement, this
gap will present increasing problems for corporate negotiators in
concentrated markets. Companies merge for a variety of reasons, often
to capture strategic synergies. Although not all mergers create
significant efficiencies, it is imperative that those that do are truly
recognized and weighed in Section 7 competitive effects balancing
analyses. Furthermore, when courts evaluate efficiencies, they should
consider both the short-term and long-term positive impacts of a
merger. It is often easiest for courts to focus on short-term cost
savings, like reduced manufacturing costs. Many important longerterm benefits, however, such as research and development or
innovation synergies, significantly contribute to the ability of U.S.
companies to grow and develop their competitive skills and
capabilities. Although these efficiencies are more difficult to quantify,
courts must recognize them.
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APPENDIX: CASE ANALYSIS OF MARKET CONCENTRATION &
EFFICIENCIES LEVELS

CASE

PRODUCT MARKET / CONCENTRATION

FTC v. Staples
(D.D.C. 1997)

High
Product market: consumable office supplies
64
sold through office supply superstores1
HHI ranges from 3,597 to 6,994 pre-merger;
post-merger HHI ranges from 5,003 to 10,000;
65
avg. HHI increase 2,715 points'
High
69
Loose leaf chewing tobacco market

FTC v. Swedish Match
(D.D.C. 2000)
FTC v. Cardinal Health
(D.D.C. 1998)

EFFICIENCIES

Low
Efficiencies not
verifiable,166 not merger
167
and not likely to
specific,
be fully passed through to
68
consumers1
Low
Not verifiable and lack of7
consumer pass-through '
HHI increased from 3,219 to 4,733170
Low
High
74
Wholesale distribution market for prescription Not merger-specific1
drugS172
HHI increased from 1,648 to 3,079173

164. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (D.D.C. 1997).
165. Id. at 1081.
166. See id. at 1089 ("[FTC expert David] Painter's testimony was compelling, and the Court
finds, based primarily on Mr. Painter's testimony, that the defendants' cost savings estimates
are unreliable . . . . The Court also finds that the defendants' projected 'Base Case' savings of $5
billion are in large part unverified, or at least the defendants failed to produce the necessary
documentation for verification.").
167. See id. at 1090 ("[The evidence shows that the defendants did not accurately calculate
which projected cost savings were merger specific and which were, in fact, not related to the
merger . . . . In fact, Mr. Painter testified that, by his calculation, forty-three percent of the
estimated savings are savings that Staples and Office Depot would likely have achieved as
stand-alone entities.").
168. See id. ("In addition to the problems that the Court has with the efficiencies estimates
themselves, the Court also finds that the defendants' projected pass through rate-the amount of
the projected savings that the combined company expects to pass on to customers in the form of
lower prices-is unrealistic.").
169. FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157 (D.D.C. 2000).
170. Id. at 167.
171. See id. at 171-72 ("[T]he Court ultimately finds that the defendants' efficiencies
evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption that the merger may substantially lessen
competition . . . . The savings that will be passed on to the consumers in the form of lower prices
in this case is at best speculative . . . . Without significantly more evidence to substantiate the
savings purported in this case, and without greater clarity on the state of antitrust law in this
circuit, the defendants are unable to rebut the presumption here with an efficiencies defense.").
172. FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).
173. Id. at 53.
174. See id. at 63 ("Weighing the evidence before it, this Court finds that the Defendants
have sufficiently proved that significant efficiencies would likely result from the proposed
mergers . ... However, this Courts finds that evidence presented by the FTC strongly suggests
that much of the savings anticipated from the mergers could also be achieved through continued
competition in the wholesale industry.").
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CASE

PRODUCT MARKET / CONCENTRATION

EFFICIENCIES

FTC v. University Health
(11th Cir. 1991)

High
Market is provision of inpatient services by
acute care hospitals175
HHI increased by over 630 points to
approximately 3,200176
High
"High technology" aircraft transparencies
market 78
Broader transparencies market had HHI of

Low
Not verifiable and lack of
consumer pass-through 77

FTC v. PPG Industries
(D.C. Cir. 1986)

Low
Efficiencies not mergerspecific

80

1,943; merger would increase this to 3,295179

FTC v. Alliant Techsystems
(D.D.C. 1992)

Low
High
Efficiencies small and not
Products and services involved in the
183
verifiable
manufacture and related servicing of all
current 120 mm tank ammunition rounds and
in the development of advanced tactical
rounds 181
Merger-to-monopoly; HHI would be 10,000182

FTC v. Libbey
(D.D.C. 2002)

High
84
Food service glassware market
HHI projected to increase from 5,251 to
6,241185

Low
Lack of consumer passthrough 86

175. FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 1991).
176. Id. at 1211 n.12.
177. See id. at 1222 ("Here, however, the appellees have failed to introduce sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that their transaction would yield any efficiencies, and the district
court's factual finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous."); id. at 1223 ("[W]e hold that a
defendant who seeks to overcome a presumption that a proposed acquisition would substantially
lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended acquisition would result in significant
economies and that these economies ultimately would benefit competition and, hence, consumers
. . . . The appellees here have not presented sufficient evidence to support their claim that the
intended acquisition would generate efficiencies benefiting consumers.").
178. FTC v. PPG Industries, Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
179. Id. at 1502-03.
180. See id. at 1508 ("Finally the district court found that a merger of PPG and Swedlow
might lead to the development of more sophisticated materials and/or transparencies . . . . [T]he
gains to be derived from technological cooperation are not exclusive to a PPG-Swedlow marriage;
cooperation with other market participants could yield similar results without causing the same
market concentration.").
181. FTC v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1992).
182. Id. at 15-16. This case is interesting as the defendants' proposed merger was a direct
response to the Army's decision to competitively bid a five-year, sole-source contract in the 120
mm market. Whether the defendants merged or the Army continued forward with its competitive
bidding process, there was ultimately only going to be one supplier left in the market. Id. at 15.
183. Id. at 21 ("Defendants' concerns regarding the risks of transferring technology to cost,
delay, and quality are speculative at best . . . . Defendants furthermore fail to consider the not
insignificant restructuring and transaction costs that would result from the merger.").
184. FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 2002).
185. Id. at 50-51.
186. See id. at 53 ("Although the evidence presented by the defendants demonstrates that
there could potentially be some positive results of the acquisition, the Court does not believe that
those results outweigh the potential harm to the market that could result given the fact that
there has not been sufficient evidence to establish how RCP will be able to compete effectively
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CASE

PRODUCT MARKET / CONCENTRATION

EFFICIENCIES

U.S. v. United Tote
(Del. 1991)

High
North American totalisator systems and
services for pari-mutuel wagering (e.g., horse
betting)187
HHI projected to increase from 3,940 to
4,6401as
High
Jarred baby food market' 90
HHI projected to increase from 4,775 to
5,285'9'
High
Partial loss and total loss software market for
insurance claims 94
HHI in Estimatics (partial loss software)
market would increase from 3,650 to 5,685195
HHI in Total Loss Valuation software market

Low
Efficiencies not mergerspecific; consumer passthrough concerns'89

FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.
(D.C. Cir. 2001)

FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc.
(D.C. Cir. 2009)

Low
Efficiencies not mergerspecific 92 and not
verifiable' 93
Low
Efficiencies not
97
verifiable,1 consumer
pass-through concerns, 99
and merger specificity
issues' 99

would increase from 4,900 to 5,460196

given the higher costs it will have to pay for its glassware, and why Libbey will not use this
opportunity to raise its own prices.") (emphasis added).
187. United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1069 (D. Del. 1991).
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1084-85 ("With regard to financing, unlike InternationalHarvester, United
Tote has failed to show that the merger is necessary to acquire the financial and service
capabilities it needs . . . . The Court's finding is guided, in part, by the reality that even if the
merger resulted in efficiency gains, there are no guarantees that these savings would be passed
on to the consuming public.").
190. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
191. Id. at 716.
192. See id. at 721-22 ("Finally, and as the district court recognized, the asserted efficiencies
must be 'merger-specific' to be cognizable as a defense. That is, they must be efficiencies that
cannot be achieved by either company alone because, if they can, the merger's asserted benefits
can be achieved without the concomitant loss of a competitor. Yet the district court never
explained why Heinz could not achieve the kind of efficiencies urged without a merger. As noted,
the principal merger benefit asserted for Heinz is the acquisition of Beech-Nut's better recipes,
which will allegedly make its product more attractive and permit expanded sales at prices lower
than those charged by Beech-Nut, which produces at an inefficient plant. Yet neither the district
court nor the appellees addressed the question whether Heinz could obtain the benefit of better
recipes by investing more money in product development and promotion - say, by an amount less
than the amount Heinz would spend to acquire Beech-Nut."). Note that the court assumed that
distribution efficiencies are a function of scale and not capabilities. See id. at 721 n.19 ("In
addition, the district court described Heinz's distribution network as much more efficient than
Beech-Nut's. It failed to find, however, a significant diseconomy of scale in distribution from
which either Heinz or Beech-Nut suffers. In other words, although Beech-Nut has an inefficient
distribution system, it can make that system more efficient without merger. Heinz's own efficient
distribution network illustrates that a firm the size of Beech-Nut does not need to merger in
order to attain an efficient distribution system.").
193. See id. at 723 ("In the absence of reliable and significant evidence that the merger will
permit innovation that otherwise could not be accomplished, the district court had no basis to
conclude that the FTC's showing was rebutted by an innovation defense.").
194. FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
195. Id. at 45.
196. Id. at 46.
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CASE

PRODUCT MARKET / CONCENTRATION

EFFICIENCIES

U.S. v. Rockford Memorial
Corp.
(N.D. Ill. 1989)

High
Acute inpatient hospital care market 200
HHI on a state inventoried beds basis
increases from 2,555 to 4,603201
HHI on inpatient admissions basis increases
from 2,789 to 5,111202
HHI on inpatient days basis increases from
3,026 to 5,647203

Low

U.S. v. Franklin Electric Co.
(W.D. Wis. 2000)

High
207
Submersible turbine pump market
Merger-to-monopoly 20 8

Low
200
Efficiencies not verifiable
No consumer pass-

Qualitative efficiencies
(improved quality and
services to consumers)
deemed irrelevant 2 0 4
Net efficiencies not
verifiable 20 5
Efficiencies
not merger206
specific

______________________________tbrough2ii
____________________

197. See id. at 73 ("The Defendants have not demonstrated here that their efficiencies are
verifiable.").
198. See id. at 74 ("Even assuming czrguendo that the Defendants will achieve significant
cost savings in a timely manner, there is no evidence to suggest that a sufficient percentage of
those savings will accrue to the benefit of the consumers to offset the potential for increased
prices ....
Second, while reducing the costs of doing business provides several advantages for
the merged firm, these advantages could show up in higher profits instead of benefiting
customers or competition. Mr. Ramamurthy admits that CCC will give its shareholders much of
any savings. Andrew Balbirer, similarly stated that the synergies from the deal would either be
invested in new products or go to company profits. Likewise, Mr. Sun of Mitchell stated that the
cost savings are likely to go to 'building value added products' rather than lowering consumer
costs.") (citations omitted).
199. See id. at 75 ("Furthermore, there is little evidence that these promises of increased R &
D spending are merger- specific.").
200. United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1292 (ND. Ill. 1989).
201. Id. at 1280.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 1288-89 ("As to qualitative benefits to consumers, the defendants proclaim
that the merger of SAHl and RMH will provide the Rockford community with a first class
regional tertiary referral center that will eventually rival tertiary referral centers in Madison,
Chicago, Milwaukee and Rochester. The defendants promise that the number, depth, and quality
of services at the hospital will improve .
The
f. court
s
finds the defendants' intention to create a
state-of-the-art tertiary referral center and all its corresponding benefits in quality and
community development as irrelevant for the present § 7 inquiry.").
205. See id. at 1289-90 ('Thus, the one sided study projects the savings derived from the
merger and none of the expenses ....
In short, the study does not reflect the net savings of the
merger; only the cost savings . . . . Some of the savings in [the nine identified areas of the
defendants' business] would occur not so much because of the economics effected by the merger,
but from a drop in production."); id. at 1290 n.21 ("Another aspect of the defendants' savings in
the area of overhead that is troubling is the lack of information on the input/output relationship
in the area of laboratory/pathology fees. Therefore, assumptions as to these savings are
impossible to verify.").
206. See id. at 1291 ("Moreover, monopoly rents could far outweigh the savings presented,
particularly in light of the fact that much of the savings cited by the defendants were not clearly
and convincingly generated by the merger. Large amounts of savings could be achieved
independent of a merger through alternative action.").
207. United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 102728 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
208. Id. at 1035.
209. Id. (finding the evidence of true efficiencies was "wanting").

2010]

MERGING IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW

1751

CASE

PRODUCT MARKET / CONCENTRATION

EFFICIENCIES

FTC v. Butterworth
(W.D. Mich. 1996)

High
General acute and primary care inpatient
211
hospitals serviceS
General acute inpatient services HHI
increases 1,064-1,889 points to final range of
2,767-4,521212
Primary care inpatient services HHI increases
1,675-2,001 points to final range of 4,506-

High
Court recognized
significant merger-specific
efficiencieS2 14

5,079213

FTC v. Illinois Cereal Mills
(N.D. Ill. 1988)

Medium
215
Industrial milled prime products market
to
2,606216
by
480
points
HHI increased

California v. American Stores Medium
Product Market: "Supermarkets," full line
Co.
grocery stores with more than 10,000 square
(C.D. Cal. 1988)
2 19
feet
Across markets affected, HHI increased
average of 245 points from a starting average

Low
217
Efficiencies not verifiable
No consumer pass218
through
Low
Efficiencies not verifiable
and pass-through concerns
eXiSt 22 1

of 2,040220

FTC v. Arch Coal
(D.C. 2004)

Medium
222
Southern Powder River Basin coal market
HHI of reserves market is 2,054. Merger will
increase it by forty-nine points to 2,103223

Medium
Some efficiencies
recognized; most
considered not to be
merger-specific or
verifiable 224

210. Id. ("Defendants have not made the necessary showing that efficiencies would result
and that they would lead to benefits for consumers in the relevant market. Not only is the
evidence of true efficiencies wanting, but the profits such efficiencies would generate would be
unlikely to affect the American customer.").
211. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
212. Id. at 1294.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1301 ("In sum, the Court is persuaded that the proposed merger would result in
significant efficiencies, in the form of capital expenditure avoidance and operating efficiencies,
totaling in excess of $100 million. This is, by any account, a substantial amount, and represents
savings that would, in view of defendant's nonprofit status and the Community Commitment,
invariably be passed on to consumers.").
215. FTC v. Ill. Cereal Mills, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1131, 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
216. Id. at 1144.
217. Id. at 1145-46 ("Elders and ICM's first argument [regarding increased efficiencies] fails
to persuade this court because it rests heavily on the assumption that eastern and western
geographic markets for prime products exist.").
218. Id. at 1146 ("Even assuming Elders is unable to efficiently operate the Lincoln mill, it
does not follow that competition in the relevant geographic market will be enhanced by the
challenged acquisition. Rather than lower prices for consumers, the likely result of the Lincoln
acquisition will be greater mill profitability.").
219. California v. Am. Stores Co., 697 F. Supp. 1125, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
220. Id. at 1130.
221. Id. at 1133 ("Moreover, even assuming these efficiency savings do result, the Court is
not convinced that defendants will invariably pass these savings on to consumers. As the State
queried, 'And, most importantly, is it really true that the new firm can achieve $50 million in
savings after servicing the debt they assumed in leverage [sic] this $2.5 billion buy-out?' ").
222. FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 121 (D.D.C. 2004).
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CASE
FTC v. Foster Refining
(D.N.M. 2007)

PRODUCT MARKET / CONCENTRATION
Medium
225
Bulk gasoline market
Court recognized a weak prima facie case
226
based upon market concentration figureS

EFFICIENCIES
Medium
Court commented that they
believed that efficiencies
existed, but this factor did
not play a determinative
227
role in their decision

U.S. v. Country Lake Foods
(Minn. 1990)

Low
228
Fluid milk processor market
Court did not accept narrow geographic
market proposed by the government
No HHI figures for broader geographic market
229
provided
Low
Government failed to establish relevant
product market as anchor hospital providing
2 1
primary / secondary service 3
Relevant product market is general acute care
inpatient hospital serviceS232
No HHI figures calculated, but court had no
concerns about concentration2 2

High
Significant efficiencies
25
recognized

U.S. v. Long Island Jewish
Medical Center
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)

High
Significant efficiencies
22 4
recognized
Court confident of
significant consumer passthrough 235

223. Id. at 128 ("Based on reserves, then, the proposed transaction may raise significant
competitive concerns-although just barely.").
224. Id. at 151 ("Of this amount, $27.4 million is general and administrative expenses, which
mr. [sic] Lange himself acknowledges is not merger-specific because 'another coal company'
without an adjacent mine could achieve it. This leaves $107.4 million in claimed merger-specific
savings from the combination. Even as to that remaining amount, however, defendants have not
made a strong case on efficiencies. Plaintiffs have systematically pointed out deficiencies in
defendants' estimates of efficiencies and shown that defendants have not been able to quantify
with precision the savings netted by the proposed transaction. Some of the efficiencies identified
by defendants are not merger-specific while others are undercut or reduced on the basis of the
evidence."); id. at 153 ("The realized efficiencies are more likely to be in the $35 to $50 million,
rather than the $130 to $140 million, range over the five year period from 2004 through 2008.").
225. FTC v. Foster, No. 07-352, 2007 WL 1793441, at *1 (D.N.M. May 29, 2007).
226. Id. at *28 ("With the inclusion of the various firms who do or could supply Albuquerque
after a small but significant price increase, the postmerger combined market share of Western
and Giant is 5.7 percent, which corresponds with a change in HHI of only fifteen. While a change
of fifteen would not be significant, the Court does not believe that it should include all the Gulf
Coast refiners, because the record does not establish that all refiners are actually or currently
sending product to the relevant market. The potential is there, but the market remains
concentrated. Both parties' experts admitted the market is concentrated, but it appears that
most such markets are similarly concentrated. Thus, the Court will find that the FTC has made
a prima facie case under the Merger Guidelines, but it is a weak prima facie case.").
227. Id. at *49 ("The Court is also convinced that there will be efficiencies resulting from the
merger."); id. at *57 ("The efficiencies of the merger have not played a determinative role in this
case.").
228. United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 671 (D. Minn. 1990).
229. Id. at 673.
230. Id. at 674 ("Significant efficiencies will be realized by Country Lake's acquisition of
Superior. This acquisition will enable Country Lake to increase its capacity substantially. This
will result in lower plant and transportation costs and other savings. At minimum, these
efficiencies will enable Country Lake to compete head-to-head with Marigold, the top-selling
dairy in the [Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Statistical Area].").
231. United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 139-40 (E.D.N.Y.
1997).
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CASE

PRODUCT MARKET / CONCENTRATION

EFFICIENCIES

U.S. v. Carilion Health

Low
Acute patient inpatient hospital services and
certain clinical outpatient health care
236
serviceS
No HHI figures calculated; court did not have
237
exact concentration figure
Case tried under Sherman Act because Act
238
applies to non-profit entitieS
an
constitute
not
would
"[M]erger
unreasonable restraint of trade under
239
Sherman Act"
Low
Primary and secondary inpatient hospital care
services 24 1
FTC failed to establish a specific geographic
242
market

High
Significant efficiencies
240
recognized

System
(4th Cir. 1989)

FTC v. Tenet Health Care
Corp.
(8th Cir. 1999)

Medium
District court should have
looked at "enhanced
efficiencies" such as better
243
medical care

232. Id.
233. Id. at 145 ("Here, the Court finds that the merged entity will not have an undue share
of the relevant product and geographic markets."). Note that in addition to the lack of market
concentration, the court did explicitly state that other factors also led them to believe that the
risk of anticompetitive effects was minimal. Id. ("In sum, the evidence in this case indicates that,
in the event the merger is consummated, it is unlikely that there will be a price increase . . . . In
making this determination, the Court must balance the reduced competition and increased
market share of the merged hospital against the suitable available alternatives, the multidiverse economic forces that are driving down hospital populations and the efficiencies to be
gained from such a merger."). While these factors may have contributed to the court's ultimate
judgment that anticompetitive effects were unlikely, the fact that no high market concentration
was proven was critical to this determination.
234. Id. at 148-49 ("Reviewing the testimony as to the claimed efficiencies in its totality, the
Court finds the proposed merger will result in significant efficiencies in the form of annual
operating savings in expenses in the sum of approximately 25 to 30 million dollars per year. In
addition, there will be some capital avoidance in an unknown amount.").
235. Id. at 149 ("Therefore, the Court finds that, with reasonable certainty, the 'efficiencies'
gained in this merger will ultimately result in benefits to the consumers." (citing hospitals'
agreement with New York Attorney General to pass on to the community cost savings equal to
$100 million during five-year period)).
236. United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 847 (W.D. Va. 1989).
237. Id. at 848.
238. Id. at 841, 849.
239. Id. at 849.
240. Id. ("Based on Roanoke Memorial's serious need to expand and Community's need for
more patients, they have found various ways in which more efficient operations can save money
and thereby enable them to offer their services more competitively than ever, to patients'
benefit."); id. at 846 ("In conclusion, the court finds that the planned merger would probably
improve the quality of health care in western Virginia and reduce its cost and will strengthen
competition between the two large hospitals that would remain in the Roanoke area.").
241. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (8th Cir. 1999).
242. Id. at 1053 ("The question before us is whether the FTC provided sufficient evidence
that the proposed merger will result in the merged entity possessing market power within the
relevant geographic market. Because we conclude that the FTC produced insufficient evidence of
a well-defined relevant geographic market, we find that it did not show that the merged entity
will possess such market power. The FTC's failure to prove its relevant geographic market is
fatal to its motion for injunctive relief.").
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CASE

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
PRODUCT MARKET / CONCENTRATION

U.S. v. Oracle Corp.
(N.D. Cal. 2004)

Low
Enterprise Resource Planning ("ERP")
24
application software market 4 -plaintiffs
failed to establish narrower "high function
245
HRM and FMS" market
Plaintiffs failed to prove that HHI in relevant
product and geographic markets would fall
246
outside of Merger Guidelines safe harbor
U.S. v. Mercy Health Services Low
24 8
Acute care inpatient hospital services
(N.D. Iowa 1995)
Government failed to establish the relevant
geographic market-no relevant HHI
figureS
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EFFICIENCIES

Low
Efficiencies are not
247
verifiable

Low
Efficiencies not mergerspecific and not
25
verifiable 0

24 9

243. Id. at 1054-55 ("We further find that although Tenet's efficiencies defense may have
been properly rejected by the district court, the district court should nonetheless have considered
evidence of enhanced efficiency in the context of the competitive effects of the merger. The
evidence shows that a hospital that is larger and more efficient than Lucy Lee or Doctors'
Regional will provide better medical care than either of those hospitals could separately. The
merged entity will be able to attract more highly qualified physicians and specialists and to offer
integrated delivery and some tertiary care . . . . The evidence shows that the merged entity may
well enhance competition in the greater Southeast Missouri area.").
244. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
245. Id. at 1108.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1175 ("The court finds Oracle's evidence on the claimed cost-savings efficiency to
be flawed and unverifiable. Catz and Ellison's personal estimations regarding the potential costsavings to Oracle are much too speculative to be afforded credibility. Oracle's efficiency defense
based upon future innovations (e.g., the superset product) was not verified by internal
documents. Oracle presented no evidence regarding the functionality of characteristics the
innovative product will contain, nor any evidence regarding its date of availability. Accordingly,
both claimed efficiencies are much too vague and unreliable to rebut a showing of
anticompetitive effects.").
248. United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 976 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
249. Id. at 987.
250. Id. ("The defendants have failed to meet this burden in several significant respects: (1) a
merger is not required to achieve many of the efficiencies; (2) implementation of the steps
necessary to achieve the efficiencies is highly speculative; and (3) the Gallagher Report
overstates the efficiencies which can be achieved.").

